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**REVIEW
OF
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY**

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seeks to advance the understanding of human existence by encouraging the dialogue between the behavioral sciences and the phenomenology of man, and to point toward the integration of the theories and data of psychology and psychiatry into a science of man based on increasing knowledge of his essential nature.

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The REVIEW welcomes all articles and communications falling into the purpose stated above.

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EDITORIAL

This issue contains the papers read at the convention of the Association of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry in New York, April 22, 1961. The theme of this convention was "Will, Decision and Responsibility." The first paper read by Dr. Erwin Straus will appear at a later date, for Dr. Straus is presently in Germany as a visiting professor, and therefore could not find the time to prepare his paper for publication.

The papers present a variety of insights and suggestions, and may be contradictory with one another at certain points. This is not surprising in view of the revolution which is taking place in the human sciences in the Western world. The beginning of such a revolution is necessarily characterized by some confusion. It is only on the basis of a continuous dialogue between the phenomenologists and the scientists of man on the international level that a gradual clarification can emerge. This clarification may lead to a working synthesis between the changing view of man in the new cultural period that is opening up in the West and the precious insights, data and methods of research which have been developed and contributed by traditional psychology and psychiatry in the passing period of culture.

Our Review intends to be a forum for this dialogue. Therefore, as we have already mentioned on page II, "the opinions and views of the contributors do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of the editors." As will be clear from the papers, the members of the editorial board themselves emphasize different aspects of human reality. This is as it should be in a journal that seeks the understanding of human existence by encouraging an open dialogue within the frame of existential phenomenology.

We hope that the variety of thought expressed in this issue will not confuse but stimulate the reader to participate on his own in the fascinating dialogue which tries to keep pace with the swift change in Western civilization that we witness today.

SARTRE, FREEDOM AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD

Hunter College

Introduction

Sartre is the first major existential philosopher who formulates explicit views on existential psychoanalysis. While much of Heidegger's work can be interpreted as an implicit critique of Freudian analysis, Sartre explicitly contrasts his views with those of Freud, thereby moving into the forefront of the discussion around existential psychoanalysis. Sartre's greater interest in psychoanalysis seems to be the result of his one basic divergence from Heidegger's approach: faithful to the Cartesian origins of French philosophy, he places the phenomenon of consciousness in the center of his thought to a much greater extent than Heidegger. For Heidegger, a genuinely ontological orientation seems to preclude emphasis on consciousness as an irreducible dimension of being because, for him, it is precisely the separation of consciousness from being that characterizes much of modern philosophy, a tendency against which Heidegger is strongly committed. For Sartre, on the other hand, it is the phenomenon of consciousness that is the dividing line between the two kinds of being around which he builds his ontology. Where Heidegger had distinguished between the Dasein and the non-Dasein, between existentialities and categories, Sartre's fundamental distinction is between "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself". In its simplest terms, this is the distinction between non-human being or the being of "things" and human being. Now, we may ask, what is there about human being that distinguishes it so clearly from all other forms of being? Sartre turns to consciousness for his answer. Drawing heavily on Husserl, he contends that consciousness "is" in a radically different way from the sense in which things "are." The being of a thing is a localization within its boundaries. To put it somewhat peculiarly, things are what they are and are not what they are not. A chair is a chair and is not a flower; in Sartre's technical terminology, things do not transcend themselves. It is otherwise with consciousness. It is of the nature of consciousness to go beyond itself. Basing himself on Husserl's notion of intentionality, Sartre finds that all consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that consciousness is inconceivable without a reaching out toward something other than itself which then is the object of consciousness. The structure of consciousness is, therefore, inherently transcendental. The object of consciousness is not an external addition, without which consciousness would still be what it is. The object of consciousness is, therefore, part of the very being of conscious-

ness and from this follows an insight of fundamental significance to Sartre: it is of the nature of consciousness to be what it is not and not to be what it is. To understand this paradoxical statement, we must keep in mind the analysis of consciousness previously indicated. Since the object of consciousness is an inherent part of its being without which it could not be consciousness, it is not going too far to say that, in the act of knowing, consciousness becomes that which it knows. This contention is not particularly original with Sartre; Aristotle (1951) in his *De Anima* had made a similar contention, arguing that in the act of knowing, the knower becomes that which he knows. Nevertheless, it is necessary to add, with some haste, that this is true only in one sense and that, in another sense, the distinction between consciousness and its object remains as great as ever. This, then, is Sartre's meaning when he asserts that being-for-itself, the being that is conscious, is what it is not and is not what it is: it is what it is not because in knowing it becomes its object which it is not. It also is not what it is because it nevertheless remains distinct from its object and, therefore, is not it.

Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself

By means of these distinctions, Sartre divides the realm of being into that of the being-for-itself, which is characterized by consciousness and transcendence, and the being-in-itself, characterized by ontological solidity and non-transcendence. In a very important sense, the whole of his *Being and Nothingness* is a discussion of the relationship between these realms of being and of the never ending encroachment of the being-in-itself on the being-for-itself. This encroachment results from the fact that being-for-itself is, essentially, constituted by freedom, a state that most people find extremely difficult to bear and, therefore, attempt, by all means available, to exchange for that of the being-in-itself. As being-for-itself, man is free because, in the act of self-knowledge, he transcends himself to the extent to which he makes himself his object of knowledge. Sartre illustrates this by means of a man who judges himself to be lazy. Put in these terms, the judgment "I am lazy" sounds very much like any other judgment that describes the nature of a thing. But there is a crucial difference. In judging myself, I find that the minute the judgment is pronounced, it is no longer I who is being judged because the real self is the one that is making the judgment, not the one that is being judged. That part of me which I judge to be lazy is, therefore, an objectivized being-in-itself which, just because it takes on the being of a thing, ceases to be me by the very act of being fixated as a something — a lazy person. The real self is thus constantly beyond such fixation because it always transcends any objectification that is attempted. Man, therefore, never "is" anything in quite the same sense in

which anything else can be said to be something. And this is precisely the essence of human freedom. The assertion that man is free means for Sartre that man can never have a nature imposed on him which will sum up what he is because, in the very act of judging himself to be that, in the very act of accepting the judgment about himself, he belies it and is thrust back into his freedom. The lazy man can, therefore, never rest in his laziness and carry it as a table carries its being-a-table or a stone its being-a-stone. Laziness, if it is to persist, must be re-chosen at every moment as a new act of freedom, even if, in one sense, this is not fully realized by the person himself. In fact, there are strong motivations for not realizing this. Though it may seem, on one level, that the kind of freedom Sartre ascribes to man is a most attractive possibility, absolving him of the burden of the past and opening to him ever new vistas for the future, in fact quite the contrary is usually the case. What it really does is to rob man of the security of possessing a nature, something all other things in the universe do not lack. Sartre finds all men to be drawn to the being of things, to the security that goes with knowing what one is. Page after page, he describes the people who have turned themselves into things. He speaks of the waiter whose every gesture and motion bespeaks the waiter. From the way he carries his napkin slung over his left hand to his walk and his slight stoop, he proclaims his being as a waiter as he approaches the table to take the orders. And in one way or another, most men adopt this stance. We see ourselves as beings who just cannot do certain things, just as some birds cannot swim or fish walk, it being contrary to their nature. In this connection, Sartre refers to the feeling of real terror that overcomes most people when they find themselves standing on the edge of a precipice. Normally, this is explained as a result of a fear of being pushed or blown over the edge, against one's will. Sartre finds this explanation most superficial. The terror that is experienced is both greater in magnitude and different in quality from the fear caused by external threats, no matter how real. The terror, argues Sartre, is of the self: it is the terror involved in the realization that we could, in fact, decide to jump, that there is literally nothing preventing us from doing just that. Normally, we feel that we are as incapable of choosing to commit suicide as we are of choosing to fly to the moon or of lifting the Rock of Gibraltar. But this, of course, is not so. While we cannot do the impossible, we can decide to take our lives and there is nothing in our psychological natures as such to prevent it. Our mental self is not given to us; it is chosen by us.

Human Being and Freedom

The very center of the mode of being that is human being, what Sartre calls being-for-itself, is, therefore, freedom. It is being

free that, according to Sartre, distinguishes man from all other beings in the universe. Now, in a very important sense, psychology is the greatest enemy of human freedom ever invented by the mind of man. To the extent to which psychology considers itself a science in the sense in which physics and chemistry are sciences, it commits itself to searching for regularities in human thought and conduct that it can then express in the form of laws. And the moment we think of human thought and conduct as being regulated by laws whose very essence is regularity and predictability, we cannot very meaningfully speak of human freedom, unless we are willing to redefine the term "freedom" to mean something quite different from what it means in common discourse. Nowhere are the issues raised by the scientific onslaught on human freedom more sharply defined than in the notion of the unconscious. The reason for this is that by means of this notion, it became possible to explain in the most convincing manner possible, the illusion of freedom inherent in human consciousness while, at the same time, showing how causal structures were at work behind the facade of consciousness of which the individual himself was not aware but which, nevertheless, were determining the content of his consciousness all the time. It is, therefore, perfectly evident that anyone committed to human freedom, especially one who places it into the very center of his interpretation of man, must come to terms with the unconscious in one way or another. Sartre's way of doing this is to subject the notion of the unconscious to a piece of logical analysis whose purpose is to sharpen the concept and, by so doing, reveal the inadequacies of the usual interpretation of it. When we speak of the unconscious, argues Sartre, we are surely not simply speaking of that which is not conscious, such as a stone or a metal. Freud speaks of the unconscious as having wishes and desires that it attempts to get satisfied and, surely, this would not be possible if the unconscious were unconscious quite literally. The next alternative then is that the unconscious is unconscious only in the sense that it is not known to my conscious. In and by itself, the unconscious is every bit as conscious as the conscious, the only difference being that it is unknown by the conscious and, therefore, unconscious to it. That this interpretation of the unconscious, too, is less than satisfactory, is not difficult to see. First, it seems to put two minds in one body: the normal consciousness of which I am aware and which in fact is myself, and my unconscious, of which I am not aware but which, nevertheless, is a consciousness and seems to occupy my body. Furthermore, and this is the crux of Sartre's argument, it does not seem possible that I am really not conscious of the content of my unconscious. Not only would this make two minds occupy every body, thereby doubling the population of the world at one psychoanalytic stroke, but it would make the act of recognition that transpires in the psychoanalytic situation when material from the unconscious is brought into consciousness, im-

possible to understand. Let us make this a little clearer. If we are to maintain that I am genuinely not conscious of the content of my unconscious, then I know as little of the content of my unconscious as I do of the content of someone else's unconscious. Now, my knowledge of another man's unconscious is based on inference and hypothesis construction: by analyzing the data of his conscious with which he presents me and by observing his behavior, I construct a hypothesis about the content of his unconscious that seems most successfully to explain the manifestations that I can directly observe. As is true of all explanatory hypotheses, I must constantly be ready to revise the hypothesis with the discovery of new data that the original hypothesis may be unable to explain or which it does not predict. But surely this is not my relationship to the content of my own unconscious. When the analyst presents me with an interpretation designed to uncover some material in my unconscious, I do not evaluate it as I would evaluate a similar interpretation of another's unconscious.

If this were the case, the therapeutic effect would be impossible because the effect is based on an emotional catharsis that presupposes an act of recognition on the part of the patient of the materials brought up from the unconscious into the conscious. But an act of recognition is possible only if the content of the unconscious is not in fact hidden from the conscious but known to it, at least to the extent of being recognizable to it when brought into consciousness through the analytic process.

Relationship of Conscious and Unconscious

There is one other aspect of the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious that Sartre feels to be in need of clarification: the position of the censor as the agent of repression. According to Freud, the material in the unconscious that is unacceptable is kept in the unconscious by the censor. The function of the censor is to keep out of consciousness all material that is too painful for the conscious. Occasionally, the censor can be fooled, especially by means of disguises such as in dreams when normally unacceptable wishes enter the conscious, not in their original form but by assuming some disguise by means of which they escape detection by the censor. The censor, in the Freudian scheme, is thus seen to occupy a position of central significance. But immediately, two difficulties present themselves. First, there is the problem of the fragmentization of the self. Who is the person in question? Is he the unconscious, the conscious, the censor, or all three of these? If we are to remain with one person rather than with three, we must avoid hypostatizing the levels of consciousness to the extent that we find ourselves dealing with three persons who, while interacting, are, nevertheless, distinct. In the Freudian scheme, it is the censor who prevents the fragmentization of the self because it is he who acts as a

bridge between the unconscious and the self. But it is exactly because of this that the notion of an unconscious inaccessible to the conscious fails. The censor, because of his very function, must be conversant with the content of both the unconscious and the conscious. He must be aware of the content of the unconscious, because only thus can he repress into the unconscious, and keep repressed, whatever wishes may be involved. In fact, the censor must constantly be aware of the content of the unconscious because this content is forever trying to leave the unconscious and enter into the conscious; repression is not something that is done once and for all: it must be kept up constantly because the repressed material is constantly endeavoring to return to the light of day. Consequently, it is clear that the censor must be well acquainted with the content of the unconscious; otherwise he would not know what belongs there. But by the same token, the censor must be equally well acquainted both with the content of the conscious and, what is more important, with the kinds of things the conscious will tolerate. Here again, this is so because otherwise the censor could not function. To be a censor, I must know what it is I am censoring and the kinds of things I must not let through and, to know this, in turn, I must know what is and what is not acceptable to the conscious. The censor must, therefore, be well acquainted with both the conscious and the unconscious. Once this is understood, argues Sartre, there remains only the identification of the censor with the self, since it is the censor who seems to know most about me; and the unconscious in the usual sense of the word has disappeared because we now realize that in its deepest core the self knows its unconscious and, therefore, the unconscious is not unconscious to it. Sartre (1956, p. 54) quotes Steckel, who writes: "Every time that I have been able to carry my investigations far enough, I have established that the crux of the psychosis was conscious."

Concept of "Bad Faith"

Yet the phenomenon Freud called neurosis remains, and even if we can no longer interpret it as the result of pressures exerted by an unconscious unknown to the patient, we must, nevertheless, account for it. To do this, Sartre turns to his notion of "bad faith," a notion that is among the most interesting developments of his existential psychoanalysis. By bad faith, Sartre refers to the act of lying to oneself, an activity that, at first glance, seems a rather impossible one. In the normal usage of the term, when one lies, one tells another person something that one knows to be untrue, with the intent of making the other person believe what is known by the liar to be untrue. This being so, it is not particularly easy to see how one can lie to oneself. When I attempt to deceive myself, I either know that I am doing this or I do not. If I know what I am doing, I am not succeeding in deceiving

myself and I am, therefore, not lying to myself since I know the truth all along. If, on the other hand, I do not know that I am attempting to deceive myself, there is once more no lying to myself because lying implies that the liar knows the truth and in this case that condition seems to be lacking. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of bad faith exists, and to understand it we must use the kind of dialectical logic we have already had recourse to when we said that man is what he is not and is not what he is. Bad faith, similarly, is an act of belief that is not a belief and an act of disbelief that is a belief. When I am in bad faith, I must know that I am in bad faith; otherwise, I would not be in bad faith. But I must also sincerely believe whatever it is that I am in bad faith about. Bad faith is, therefore, the dialectic of sincerity. The foundation of bad faith is sincerity: the more sincerity there is to begin with, the more profound and interesting the bad faith is. The reason for this is that sincerity is never non-dialectical. The very judgment of myself as sincere, which is a judgment I cannot avoid making if I am genuinely sincere, projects me beyond my sincerity and once this happens, I no longer coincide with my sincerity. The portion of the self that judges me to be sincere is outside of the sincerity and is, therefore, not sincere. But this is bad faith: a stance of sincerity of which I am conscious and which is, therefore, known by me not to be the genuine article.

Human Being as Choice

With the unconscious released from its undisclosed hiddenness and transformed into the choice of bad faith, it is understandable that Sartre's thought moves toward the crystallization of human being as a fundamental choice in terms of which all subsequent deprivations and frustrations are understood. Every psychic deprivation, argues Sartre, presupposes an antecedent choice in favor of the satisfaction without which the deprivation cannot be considered a deprivation. No jail deprives a prisoner who does not wish to leave it of his freedom. Similarly, no lack of maternal affection is a psychic wound when there is no antecedent fundamental project to obtain that affection. From Sartre's point of view, it is precisely this truth that accounts for the great diversity of reactions observed to follow from similar "deprivations": what is a severe trauma in the context of one project is vastly less than that in the context of another. And, continues Sartre, each man's fundamental project is his own in the sense that it constitutes his very being as freedom and for it he bears full responsibility. The task of existential psychoanalysis is the uncovering of this project and the acceptance of full responsibility for it. This does not mean that prior to analysis the fundamental project is hidden from consciousness, thereby absolving the individual of responsibility for it. It is all there in the full light of day, a "mystery in

broad daylight". Reflection, writes Sartre (1956, p. 571), "grasps everything, all at once, without shading, without relief, without connections of grandeur — not that these shades, these values, these reliefs, exist somewhere and are hidden from it, but rather because they must be established by another human attitude and because they can exist only by means of and for knowledge." The psychoanalytic process thus refers to a bringing into self-consciousness or knowledge, not something that is "below" or "outside" of it, but a structure that is in consciousness all along, without this being realized. And, what is perhaps most important, every fundamental project will be, in an ultimate sense, contingent and not the expression of energies common to all men. As Sartre (1956, p. 571) puts it: "Nothing prevents our conceiving a priori of a 'human reality' which would not be expressed by the will to power, for which the libido would not constitute the original undifferentiated project."

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AUTHOR'S NOTE:

This paper constitutes part of a chapter on Sartre from a study of Existential Psychoanalysis to be published by Prentice-Hall in 1962.

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COMMENT ON SARTRE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY

HENRY ELKIN

New York, N.Y.

Introduction

I first began to read Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* in happy anticipation, well-nigh enthusiasm, because of his concern with the structure of consciousness. For the general incomprehension and neglect of this subject, which refers to the essence of human mind or spirit, vitiates the conceptual foundations of all non-existential depth psychologies. However, my strenuous and often perhaps futile effort to grasp Sartre's subtle intricacies of logic, spun out in a verbal diarrhea of compulsive intellectualism, has on repeated instances driven me to near exasperation. Hence I am grateful to Dr. Wyschogrod for clearly and cogently presenting Sartre's main line of thought. I regard it as a remarkably accurate delineation of the human psychological problem as perceived by a brilliant and profound, yet narrowly intellectualistic mind. I hope that my remarks will clarify this judgment while serving to put living flesh, so to speak, on Sartre's frame of thought.

At the outset, let me say that his fundamental distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, although relevant to ontology, is misleading for psychology. I would call being-for-itself, in keeping with customary usage, *personal* being. But however much a human individual who lacks personal being may suggest a non-human object, a being-in-itself, he is, of course, never really that. The field of his non-personal being is inherently *collective*. At the first conference of our association two years ago I proposed the terms personal and collective as the fundamental concepts of an existential psychology.

It is generally recognized, although not denoted as such, that the earliest stage of post-natal human life is totally collective; that is, the psyche of the newborn infant, without any consciousness of itself, absorbs or reverberates to the mother's feelings as these impinge on its bodily sensations. Personal being arises with self-consciousness, but the individual forever remains a partially collective being, susceptible to contagion of feeling as in the diverse forms of suggestibility and empathy. The paramount issue of human life, on which depends the person's good faith or bad faith in Sartre's terms, is whether his consciousness in its inherent structure gives priority to the values that belong to the personal or to the collective sphere of life.

This abstract formulation will be made clear, I hope, as we examine how consciousness acquires its definitive elemental character. I have shown (Elkin, 1958-59; 1961) that this process

belongs to the second half of the first year of life, and involves what Melanie Klein calls the "depressive position" and Rene Spitz and others the "eighth-month depression." It is directly induced by the child's hatred of the mother as countered by the fear to express it because of dependence on her bounties. This is, in fact, the universal situation of original choice which is apt to be confused with a later situation that we shall examine presently.

Insofar as the mother-child relation has been a communion, a *co-union* of distinct persons united by mutual love, the child's ego, formed by a consciousness that is structured by recognition of this love, is what I've called a *communal* ego (or part of the ego). Depending on the strength of this ego, the child will choose daringly to express his hatred along with his peremptory desires. At some variable point, however, he will inevitably meet with failure in this heroic course. Insofar as the mother then fails intuitively to understand her child and respond with keen sympathy to his discomfiture, the communion between them is broken; and to that extent, the child, prey to stifled fear and hatred, and unrequited need for love, falls into depression.

The unnerved child soon learns, however, to gain the mother's favor by concealing his real feelings and responding to her wishes, which is a direct inversion of their proper roles. This original submission to physical power, which is the prototype of moral infirmity, proves, however, to have an inverse yet prodigious spiritual power: it transforms the physically all-powerful mother into an amiable puppet. Thus the child becomes aware of his seductive charm whose veiled power, moreover, allows for the release of his suppressed hatred in safe disguise. And so arises what I've called the *autistic* ego (or part of the ego) which is founded on fear and hatred, and functions by hidden cunning, artifice, and guile.

The child then inevitably projects his own conscious diabolism on the mother (where it generally befits her own unconscious variety). Hence her endearments especially provoke in him acute paranoid anxiety. The child's panic, in turn, provokes the mother to ever closer, more embosoming endearments. The heightened tension which is thus built up between the child's mental terror and erotic gratification must reach a breaking point. And of course it is the child's mental or spiritual identity that gives way to a blissful state of collective-erotic fusion or identity with the mother. In short, the child is hypnotized, so that what previously were expressions of conscious, personal cunning and deceit now simply reflect an underlying collective identity with her. This process, by which the autistic ego gains security and, in hidden fantasy at least, erotic gratification by identifying with a more powerful individual or group, I've called *social collectivization*.

Collectivization

Social collectivization is the psychical foundation of what Sartre calls bad faith. He speaks of it, however, as a free, conscious choice, whereas I portray it as the result of an hypnosis. This contradiction is partially lifted when we examine Sartre's conception more closely. He says (1956, p. 573) that the free choice is "not resident in consciousness, but... is one with this consciousness itself"; that is, the type of consciousness is itself an expression of the critical choice. Now the type of consciousness that characterizes the *socially collectivized autistic ego* is one that gives priority to the value of emotional security, as linked in the psychic depths with the passive erotic bliss of (partial) collective identity, over the values of inner truth, reason, and coherence which reflect its personal being. In the original process of social collectivization, as in all hypnosis, it perhaps may be said that the autistic ego consents to the alienation from itself. But we can hardly call the surrender of a panic-stricken mind to the *force majeure* of erotic felicity a free choice. And thereafter, the collectivized autistic ego cannot by itself choose to forego its state of hypnotic trance if only because its own experience of personal freedom resulted in panic terror. (When this type of ego is torn between collective identifications with disparate groups, as pre-eminently in the case of what sociologists call "the marginal man," it must, to be sure, decide between variable alternatives. But such decisions ensue more by compulsion than by inherently free, rational choice.)

Self-determination by actual free choice depends on the strength of the communal ego. For only a center of consciousness that has been structured by the recognition of mutual love (whether or not the person is conscious of this) can offset and serve to dispel the hypnotic trance by which the autistic ego remains collectivized. Hence it is the experience of love, contained in the communal ego, that makes possible the awareness of personal hatred (not to be confused with collective hatreds) such as gives rise to the autistic ego. And only insofar as personal love or hate arise in consciousness is there even an awareness of the possibility of choice between giving expression to one's personal or collective tendencies. The choice made is usually rationalized, of course, in terms of extraneous, secondary values. The real issue, however, was cogently put by Kierkegaard as that between choosing to be oneself or not to be oneself. The choice in favor of one's collective being, or choosing not to be oneself, perpetuates the mental, spiritual dissolution of the psyche or soul in bad faith. But the choice in favor of personal freedom and integrity, or good faith, involves the grave risk of fully liberating the autistic ego from its collectivized state. The danger that may ensue is shown in full degree by those unfortunate persons who are thrown wholly into personal being without

choice — by not having been inducted (as in “infantile autism”), or by being rejected or cast out from a state of collective identity. The consequent free expression of their inherently psychopathic and paranoid autistic egos drives them into criminality or insanity. Hence the typically collectivized person has good reason to shy away from personal freedom. For it raises inklings of uncontrollable lust and hatred, panic terror, and overwhelming guilt. As he himself senses, he could seriously consider taking the risk of personal freedom only if his autistic ego were gratified by extraordinary power, fame, or fortune. The public images of the Hollywood stars well reflect the life of personal freedom as envisioned by modern collectivized man.

Only the creative person, in whom the communal ego (or the feeling-memory of communal experience) is fairly strong, can normally even dare to risk the choice of personal freedom, of good faith, or to be himself. The released psychopathic and paranoid tendencies of the autistic ego then enter into fateful struggle with the communal structure of the ego. It is the powerful tension between these two poles of personal being that has given rise to the great creative achievements of mankind. But even when this tension brings forth creative works, the person may still remain in psychic jeopardy — as witness the many creative geniuses who behaved psychopathically or succumbed to insanity.

Implications of Sartre for Psychotherapy

Now what implications does this portrayal of Sartre's good faith and bad faith, as associated with personal and collective being, have for psychotherapy?

To begin with, it shows that at the core of the human problem in general, and of all mental illness in particular, there is the paranoid and psychopathic mental structure of the autistic ego which is rooted in the second half of the first year of life. Not only does psychotherapy generally fail to treat this psychotic core, but it aims in effect, by theory and technique, to seal it off—if only by not fathoming, and respecting, its hidden meanings. Such therapy can never cure the psychotic or borderline psychotic, the addict, or the homosexual; and the relatively superficial cures it does effect with neurotic patients have a negative as well as a positive meaning. For although the patient's freedom may be enlarged in his social life, this life itself is still lived fundamentally, if less narrowly, on the foundation of socially collective identifications and attachments. That is, the person will still be living in bad faith, will not have chosen to be himself, to realize in freedom his unique personal being.

This is the issue that distinguishes the existential from other approaches to the human problem. Sartre's existential philosophy implies that it may be resolved solely by reason and will power. It is worth noting, I believe, that his outlook reflects certain

distinctive qualities of French culture. The personal will and its power of reason are generally less inhibited and circumscribed in France. It is more permissible, because feasible in refined social forms of language, to express lust and personal hatred as well as love. And as the autistic ego is less repressed, the communal ego is less swamped by collective identifications. Hence there is a deeper understanding and appreciation, and a generally more widespread realization of personality — as manifest in psychic individuality, personal love, and creativity. In America, especially, the greater repression of the autistic ego, if only by its circumscription to the realm of practical ambition, gives rise to more intensive social collectivization as manifest in conformism and the failure to distinguish love from mutual seduction. It is also pertinent to mention that the French language itself permits a greater expression of primary affective meanings not only by virtue of refined verbal forms of communication, but also more primitively, in its distinctive vocal sounds and movements. Speaking French requires strong, coordinated muscular action involving the whole region of the mouth, lips, jaw, nose, and throat. Hence the child who learns this language will less fully repress his oral tendencies which contain the rudimentary essence of psychic individuality. The particular shortcomings of French culture, as blatantly manifest by Sartre, largely reflect a widespread fixation of personality on the oral level.

It is perhaps Freud's most positive contribution to psychology to have shown, as in his theory of the superego, that inner compulsions which are inherently extraneous to the personality gravely limit the person's autonomous will and rational, free choice. But non-existential depth psychologies, from Freud on, seek to remove from the psyche only those introjected compulsive elements which appear to be harmful; and they in effect reconstitute them after the image of new parental figures, a seemingly "benevolent superego." Since the psychotic and psychopathic autistic ego, even if sometimes diminished, still remains socially collectivized, we are here dealing with halfway, *un-wholesome* versions of psychotherapy which, in its proper essence, is a process of de-collectivization, or de-hypnotization. The prevailing theories of depth psychology, in fact, largely serve as rationalizations for the broken autonomous will and for the expression of the collectivized autistic ego in a framework of social experience.

Existential Psychology and Psychotherapy

Only an existential psychology, which recognizes that inherently rational, self-conscious mind, or spirit, is the essence of *human* being can do justice — and avoid doing violence — to personality. And only in this theoretical light will the therapist be able to grasp the psychic processes that lie at the core of

mental illness. No theory, of course, however perfect, can by itself enable the therapist to effect a cure in the psychic depths; it is his own personality that is the critical factor here. A therapeutic personality is a creative one—one that has not avoided the risk of psychosis by fastening on some collectively sanctioned theory or ideology which bars him from a wide and fertile consciousness of his own psychic depths; and one that has already gone far, *and never ceases to progress*, along the course which the patient must travel: that of establishing the primacy of the personal over the collective aspects of the psyche, and coordinately, of reducing the autistic ego, which is a defensive and illusory deformation of the personal, to the advantage of the rationally coherent, personal, communal ego. Such a personality will inspire, beneath the inevitable suspicion and mistrust, that basic trust (stressed in the writings of Erik Erikson and Edith Weigert) which is the opposite of authoritative or seductive power, and is the *sine qua non* of properly effective therapy.

Existential psychotherapy through the developing encounter between patient and therapist is, in fact, an *experiential* therapy in which insight, or self-knowledge, is gained by direct personal experience. Since this therapeutic encounter aims to rectify the patient's infantile, pre-verbal experience, the interplay of personalities may often be intensified on an elemental level by extending the range of communication to the non-verbal forms of gestures, movements, sounds, grimaces, and even by physical contacts so long as they remain pre-eminently on a personal level of experience. Such procedures are suggested by C. Whitaker and T. Malone in their *Roots of Psychotherapy* which, to my knowledge, offers the most thorough account of the process of psychotherapy that is consistent with the principles of existential theory (always bearing in mind the dangers that must arise when these principles and procedures are taken over by therapists with non- or anti-therapeutic personalities). I have also at times found most valuable, though ancillary, some of the simpler physical techniques used in "bio-energetic therapy," whose impressive theoretical foundation is presented in A. Lowen's *Physical Dynamics of Character Structure*. But techniques and procedures are only variable means to further the goal of the therapeutic encounter, which is the communion, or *co-union* of the distinct personalities of patient and therapist in profound mutual understanding and goodwill.

COMMENT ON SARTRE'S APPROACH

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

BERNARD J. BOELEN was born in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, in 1916. He received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with high honors from the University of Louvain, Belgium. In Holland, he taught philosophy at the Dutch Institute of Foreign Relations and at Tilburg. Coming to America in 1950, Dr. Boelen first taught at St. Mary's College, Winona, Minnesota, and was chairman of the Department of Philosophy. Since 1955, he has been Professor of Philosophy at Duquesne University, where he teaches Contemporary European Philosophy in the Graduate Department of Philosophy. Dr. Boelen has lectured extensively both here and abroad, and is the author of *Eudaimonie en het Wezen der Ethiek* and numerous articles. Presently, he is preparing *The Road to Maturity; An Existential Analysis of Adolescence*.

LOUIS DE ROSIS is a native of New York. After receiving his Bachelor of Arts degree from Columbia College in 1938, he acquired his medical degree from the Long Island College of Medicine in 1942. Following a general internship at Kings County Hospital, Dr. De Rosis undertook psychiatric training at the Brooklyn State Hospital and at the Psychiatric Institute. In 1950, he became a Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, and also obtained a Certificate in Psychoanalysis at the American Institute for Psychoanalysis. He has taught at the Long Island College of Medicine and the American Institute. Dr. De Rosis is in private practice of psychoanalysis, including psychoanalysis in groups, and has written on the therapeutic experience and process in group analysis and related subjects.

HENRY ELKIN was born in 1914 in Atlantic City, N.J., and is currently in private practice in New York City. Prior to receiving his A.B. at the University of Wisconsin in 1935, he studied at the University of Berlin in the Fall of 1932 and at the Sorbonne from 1933 to 1934. After receiving his Ph.D. at Columbia University in Social Anthropology in 1940, he became

a Rockefeller Fellow, as a member of the "Research Project on Totalitarian Communication." From 1942 to 1943 Dr. Elkin served in the Office of War Information in New York and Algiers, and then in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946. After lecturing in numerous locations, including the New School for Social Research, the Cooper Union, etc., he studied from 1951 to 1955 at the C. G. Jung Institute, Zurich. Dr. Elkin has written numerous articles and a section of the book *Acculturation of Seven Indian Tribes*, and is a Council Member of the A.A.E.P.P.

LESLIE H. FARBER received his A.B. at the Stanford University in 1934 and four years later his M.D. at the Stanford Medical School. From 1939 to 1942 he was in-training at the Washington-Baltimore Psychoanalytic Institute. He is currently training analyst at the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute and has been chairman of the faculty at the Washington School of Psychiatry since 1955. From 1942 to 1955 he held numerous positions throughout the country at clinics, hospitals, etc., including the directorship of the Institute of Mental Hygiene at Norfolk, Virginia and membership on the attending staff at the Mt. Zion Psychiatric Clinic, San Francisco. He has published a number of articles in various journals.

MAURICE STANLEY FRIEDMAN graduated *magna cum laude* from Harvard University, received his M.A. at Ohio State in 1947, his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1950 and the Doctor of Laws, *honoris causa*, at the University of Vermont in 1961. Presently, Dr. Friedman is Professor of Philosophy at Sarah Lawrence College, and on the faculties of the New School for Social Research and the Washington (D.C.) School of Psychiatry. He has been a visiting professor at a number of colleges and institutes. Among his many publications are the following: *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*; *The Covenant of Peace*; *The Problematic Rebel*; and *Melville, Dostoevsky, Kafka and Our Image of Modern Man*. Dr. Friedman is the Editor and/or Translator of a number of books including Buber's *Pointing the Way: Collected Essays* and *The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism*.

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S APPROACH TO WILL, DECISION AND RESPONSIBILITY

BERNARD J. BOELEN

Duquesne University

Introduction

Martin Heidegger is a philosopher of Being rather than a philosopher of man. "The exposition of the structure of *Dasein*," says Heidegger (1949, p. 436), "remains merely a *way*, the *aim* is the elaboration of the question of Being." Nevertheless, it is precisely in the light of this fundamental ontology that man discloses his fundamental structure, his most original perspectives and his primordial situation. "Every philosophical doctrine of the being of man is *ipso facto* a doctrine of the being of reality. Every doctrine of Being is *ipso facto* a doctrine of the being of man" (Heidegger, 1954c, p. 73). In other words, the question of man cannot be asked outside the question of Being; and the question of Being finds its natural *locus* in *Dasein*, or the being of man. *Sein* (Being) reveals itself as *Da-sein* (Being-there); and *Dasein* or man is essentially the *locus* of the self-manifestation of *Sein* or Being. *Dasein* is man as the participant in the actuality of Being, or the open relation to the totality of all that is. All *fundamental* thinking takes place *within* the dynamic relationship between *Sein* and *Dasein* (Heidegger, 1954c, p. 74). The essence of man is his *ex-sistence* (in the etymological sense of the word) (Heidegger, 1955, p. 13).

Consequently, only by *ex-sisting*, by transcending himself, by standing in the openness of Being can man understand himself authentically. Man discloses his true nature by participating in the event of Being in which he is utterly involved. Those who accuse Heidegger of subjectivism merely demonstrate their misunderstanding of both subjectivism and Heidegger. For Being, or the self-manifestation of all that is, never reveals itself as an *ob-ject* (*Gegenstand*), as something "standing over against" man as a human *sub-ject*, or as something to be "faced" by man as a mere "onlooker." Being is never something that can be controlled or calculated by man from his privileged standpoint of an "outsider." Heidegger rightly calls such an approach subjectivism or *Standpunktsphilosophie*. There is no vantage point "outside" the totality of all that is. On the contrary, our *ex-sistence* is utterly involved.

Since the question of Being involves not only the object in question, but also the questioner and even the question itself, it transcends the dichotomy between subject and object, and is rather "ontocentric" than "anthropocentric." Strictly speaking, the primordial self-manifestation of Being is not of our own

making, but it escapes our control, it is inspirational, posits itself and makes us. "*Es gibt Sein*," says Heidegger. And Being *gives* itself authentically only in the act in which it is truly received, namely in the authentic *Ent-schlossenheit* which means both the *openness* and the *resolve* of our ex-sistence. Now, for Heidegger will and resolve are one and the same thing. "To will is to be resolved," (Heidegger, 1953, p. 16) he says in his *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. An analysis of resolve, therefore, will elucidate the essential structure of the human will. Moreover, the structure of resolve reveals the existential decision of the will to respond to the differentiated voice of Being as *logos*. Consequently, an analysis of resolve will also reveal to us the onto-logical meaning of the human will, decision and responsibility as a unitary structure. For the sake of brevity I will mostly replace the term *resolve* by the term *will*.

"Being-in-the-World"

Man as *Dasein* is always *already* in a *Seinsverständnis*, in an understanding of Being. *Dasein* has a connatural knowing of Being or a *lumen naturale*, in which his essence is disclosed as ex-sistence. This ex-sistence is either the unauthentic openness of the world of his *environment* (*Umwelt*), or the authentic openness (*Erschlossenheit*) of *the world* (*Welt*) as "the ontic condition of the possibility of the discoverability of any beings encountered" (Heidegger, 1949, p. 87). In other words, the relation between man and world is never the relation between man as a subject and the world as an object. Man is never the closed substance, the pure ipseity or the acosmic self-ness of the rationalistic philosophies. Man understands himself only out of a world, unauthentically out of the world of his environment, authentically out of the world of Being or the totality of all that is. "Being-in-the-world" is man's "ex-sistence." "Being-in-the-world" is man's primordial situation or *Lebenswelt* (immediately lived world). And as such "Being-in-the-world" is the true starting point of existential analysis. For Heidegger, it goes without saying, existential analysis is never mere *Existenzerhellung* (illumination of individual existence), but rather *fundamental ontology*. Fundamental ontology attempts to disclose the *existentialia* or ontological characteristics of the structure of ex-sistence. The first *Existenzial* of *Dasein* is precisely the unique but complex phenomenon of his "Being-in-the-world."

Now, it is the "Being-in" (*In-Sein*) of "Being-in-the-world" that we are predominantly interested in, since it is the "Being-in" which is the essential resolve (*Erschlossenheit*) (Heidegger, 1949, p. 270), and "to will is to be resolved" (Heidegger, 1953, p. 16). It is, therefore, the *will* that places man in the world and makes him "ex-sist." Consequently, the will as the resolved "Being-in" is an essential mode of *Dasein* and an *Existenzial*

(Heidegger, 1949, p. 45). The human will, according to Heidegger, is none of the following: a thing, a separate faculty, self-control, an instrument for the control of the world, a storing up of energy for action, a mere decision to act or the will to power. The essential human will is rather the will to openness, the will to open up the human "Being-there" into the clearing of the totality of all that is, the will to let beings be. The human will is true resolve and authentic freedom (Heidegger, 1953, p. 16). Consequently, the will is an *Existenzial*, co-original with the other existentialistic structures of *Dasein*, and involves *the whole of our ex-sistence*. "He who wills," says Heidegger (1959, p. 20), "he who puts his whole existence into a *will*, is resolved." An analysis of the "Being-in" of "Being-in-the-world," or of the "Da", the "there" of *Dasein*, will reveal the existentialistic structure of resolve, and, consequently, of the human will. Of course, the "Being-in" of *Dasein* should not be taken in the "spatial" sense in which the candy is in the box. The "Being-in" is rather an active participation, and means to "dwell", to "stay", to "cultivate", to "care" and to "sojourn", in the sense of the Latin word "habitare."

Analysis of "Being-in"

Now, the analysis of "Being-in" reveals that its existentialistic structure is characterized by various constitutive and co-original elements, namely: *Befindlichkeit* or "primordial mood," *Verstehen* or "under-standing," and *Rede* or "discoursiveness" (Heidegger, 1949, pp. 133, 269). This existentialistic structure, therefore, is also the structure of the human will. Let us briefly elucidate the existentialistic structure of the authentic will.

Befindlichkeit

First, the will is characterized by *Befindlichkeit* or "primordial mood"; and Heidegger employs the word *Befindlichkeit* with all its German connotations. Through the will man does not stand in the world in a neutral, indifferent or controlling way, but man's ex-sistence in its entirety is *affected* by this "Being-in." The will places man in a primordial mood (*Stimmung*), since he is *tuned in* (*gestimmt*) to *Being* or the totality of all that is. This primordial mood of the will (*gestimmte Befindlichkeit*) is what Eugen Fink (1947) calls "primordial enthusiasm." The will is not self-enclosed, but dynamically tuned in to that which transcends in its totality. The will does not stand *in opposition* to our particular moods and feelings, but is their *permanent source*. These particular sentiments, moods and feelings are not the "internal" reactions of a basically "mood-less" self to "external" events, but particular modifications of my primordial mood or existentialistic enthusiasm.

Another connotation of the word *Befindlichkeit* is *sich befinden* with the emphasis on *sich*, or to-find-oneself. The true will constitutes my authentic self. It is my fundamental event or *Er-eignis* in which we hear both the word "event" (*Ereignis*) and the word "self" (*eigen*). The active entering into my authentic self is an *Existenzial*, and only "happens" when this willing self is tuned in to Being, and lets beings be. In other words, the true self-ness of *Dasein* is neither the human substantiality in the closed sense of Descartes, nor is it the *Ich* (ego) of Kant which is acosmic and outside the world. Such an approach, Heidegger (1949, p. 267) warns us, would reduce the will to an unchanging *Vor-handenes* or a *thing*. Those who mistake the will for the storing up of energy for action also reduce the will to a thing. And this the will cannot possibly be, since it is *eine Weise zu existieren*, a fundamental mode of *ex-sistence* or an *Existenzial* (Heidegger, 1949, p. 267). The fact, however, that the will is not acosmic, and isolated from the world, should not lead us to the opposite conclusion, namely, that the will is entirely imbedded in our everyday existence. The *ich selbst* or the personal self of the will is certainly open into the depersonalized level of *Man-selbst* or the collective existence of "everyone." At the same time, however, the authentic will is an *Existenzial*, and as *ex-sistence* it always transcends the world of everydayness.

The authentic will is not the *acosmic ipseity* resulting from the reifying spirit of abstraction of the rationalists. But neither is the true will the absolute *durch sich*, the pure creativity or perfect aseity of the idealists. Both views contradict the primary data of human *ex-sistence*. That the will is not absolute aseity or pure creativity is discovered in the third implication of *Befindlichkeit*, namely: *sich befinden* with the emphasis on *befinden* or to-find-oneself. Our *ex-sistence* is not of our own making, we find ourselves, we are "thrown" into the world (*Geworfenheit*), we are always *already* there. Our "thrownness" or the radical contingency of our existence is experienced and accepted in the "cosmic dizziness" of *anxiety*. This anxiety (*Angst*) of the authentic will is neither the closed experience of neurotic anxiety, nor pure horror or confusion. "It would be truer," says Heidegger (1955, p. 29), "to say that anxiety is pervaded by a particular kind of peace." This anxiety is neither a sickness nor a defect of the will, but rather a fundamental condition for its health and authenticity. In the phenomenon of thrownness, in the groundless dizziness of anxiety we discover that the will is not absolute aseity in the sense of pure creativity, and that to posit oneself and to *ex-sist* are not one and the same thing as Fichte suggested.

The phenomenon of "thrownness" also demonstrates that the identification of *will* and *self-control* is based on a misconception of the will. In fact, this becomes evident in the light of all three structural elements of *Befindlichkeit*. The *controlling* attitude calls for a vantage point outside the object to be controlled. As

ex-sistent the authentic will is tuned in to the *totality* of all that is, and no such vantage point is given. Moreover, our authentic self is constituted by our openness to this totality. This is why we cannot be the complete possessors of our authentic selves, and why no man can strictly speaking possess or control his will. And, finally, our thrownness discloses our *ex-sistence* as *given*, which constitutes the final reason why we are not in full control of our own selves. Our authentic self is given, is more than it is, is a response, is inspirational. Over and again Heidegger (1945a, p. 16) makes statements such as "Man does not 'possess' freedom as a property. Rather the opposite is true: freedom possesses man and this enables him to *ex-sist*."

Self-control cannot mean the control of the "unauthentic self" by the "authentic self" either. That would place the authentic self *outside* the unauthentic self, we would relapse into the Cartesian dualism, and man would no longer be authentic *ex-sistence*. Rather than speaking of self-control in connection with the human will, we can employ the term "self-discipline," at least if we understand this term in the etymological sense of the word: *disciple*. The authentic self, by letting the unauthentic self be, lets it listen to the voice of Being, makes it a disciple of the binding criterion of the openness of Being, which is freedom (Heidegger, 1954a, pp. 12-19). The human will can only be authentic by accepting its incarnation, by letting the unauthenticity be and by a respectful dialogue with that which it transcends. But if the *controlling attitude* becomes predominant we are faced with *the will to power*. The will to power no longer lets beings be; its exclusive aim is to subdue the whole of reality. The will to power is the will which is "out of tune" (*Verstimmung*) with the openness of Being. This will is the will of the human *sub-ject*, the will which only wills itself, the will as closed substance, and not the authentic will of man as *ex-sistence*. This will is not the will of the authentic self, but the selfish will of the autistic ego; it is a mere "striving" to subdue reality, and makes *itself* rather than *Being* the norm of this striving. This will is no longer the authentic *will to Being*, but the devaluated and subjectivistic *will to power* (Heidegger, 1950, pp. 193-247).

Verstehen

The second structural characteristic of the will, co-original with primordial mood, is *Verstehen* (under-standing). At first this may seem surprising, since traditionally we place the source of understanding in the *intellect*. Heidegger's thinking, however, is more primary than the traditional thinking, is radically rooted in Being, and cuts across the traditional division between ontology, epistemology and ethics.

"Under-standing" in this primary sense is the "creative standing" of *ex-sistence under* the openness of Being, and as such it

is the counter-phenomenon to thrownness. Thrownness is not a closed fact (*abgeschlossenes Factum*) which happened in the past, and which I have to undergo passively (Heidegger, 1949, p. 179). On the contrary, I have to accept my thrownness actively as an *Existenzial*, which means that I become a responsible co-thrower throughout my ex-sistence. "As thrown," says Heidegger (1949, p. 145), "*Dasein* is thrown into a projecting way of Being." *Dasein* as ex-sistence is *Ver-stehen*, i.e., actively standing (*stehen*) beyond itself (*ver*). Ex-sistence as self-transcendence is shedding light, is illuminating Being, is self-projection, is realization of potentialities, is progressive disclosure of the meaning of its "Being-in-the-world." As co-original with thrownness, also understanding is rather a gift from Being than merely an act of man. Rather than being an attribute of man, understanding is constitutive of his very ex-sistence (Heidegger, 1953, p. 108; 1959, p. 141).

As a structural element of the will, understanding reveals that the human will is authentic only in so far as it wills beyond the will and continues to do so, in other words, in so far as it remains creative and original. "The original," says Heidegger (1953, p. 111; 1959, p. 145), "remains original only if it never loses the possibility of being what it is: origin as emergence." The true will, therefore, is never a static "state" of being, but rather the very creativeness of our ex-sistence. The authentic will is the birth of the *lumen naturale*, the natural light of Being in man. Consequently, the will is not a special faculty as opposed to the intellect; the will is rather the existentialistic grasping of the natural light of Being in man. Heidegger also cuts across the division between the "will to action" and "theoretical knowledge." This means that for Heidegger the will to carry out certain plans, the mere decision to act and all forms of theoretical and practical knowledge are merely *derivatives* of the authentic will. All these forms of knowledge presuppose the fundamental openness of ex-sistence created by the will as response to the self-manifestation of Being. *Truth*, for Heidegger, is not primarily the correspondence between a subject and an object, but that which is presupposed by such a correspondence, namely the radical openness or active unconcealment (*aletheia*) of Being (Heidegger, 1954a). The true will is the will of the truth or the unconcealing openness of Being. "The relation of the will to Being," says Heidegger (1953, p. 16; 1958, p. 21), "is one of letting-be." And this defines the *freedom* of the will. "Freedom reveals itself in letting-be what is" (Heidegger, 1954a, p. 15). The authentic freedom of the will, therefore, is not the possessive attitude of the will, but rather its respectful openness that allows things to reveal themselves the way they are. The freedom of the will is not freedom *from*, but freedom *to*, is not freedom of choice, but freedom of engagement.

Rede

Finally, the third structural characteristic of the will, co-original with primordial mood and under-standing, is *Rede* or discursiveness. It is especially this characteristic that reveals the will as primordial decision and responsibility. Discursiveness is not the human discourse, but rather its ontological foundation. Discursiveness is the differentiated, articulated or dialectical way in which Being manifests itself in *Dasein*. Even silence and listening belong to this discursiveness. Listening is the existentialistic openness of *Dasein* as *Mit-sein*, as co-Being with others (Heidegger, 1949, p. 163). Now, the dialectical self-manifestation of Being or *logos* is an *Existenzial* of the will. By responding to Being the will responds to the *logos*, and becomes diversified or *ex-sistent* in the etymological sense of the word. The essential discursiveness of the will, therefore, constitutes the true will as the primordial *de-cision* (standing apart—*Ent-scheidung*) to respond to the multifarious call of the *logos*, or the differentiated openness (*Entschlossenheit*) of the world. To be an existentialistic differentiation or primordial *de-cision* is an *Existenzial* of the will. As primordial *de-cision*, therefore, the will is not a mere decision to act, nor a choice resulting from a judgment, but rather the permanent source and ontological foundation of all our actions, judgments and choices, and of all our theoretical and practical knowledge (Heidegger, 1953, pp. 16, 84; 1959, pp. 21, 110). The primordial *de-cision* of the authentic will *gives rise to* the world (*ent-stehen lassen*) and preserves its true openness (*Entschlossenheit*) (Heidegger, 1953, p. 47; 1959, p. 62).

The will as primordial decision discloses itself as existentialistic *responsibility* in the etymological sense of the word. The will is a multifarious *answer* to the differentiated call of the *Rede* or *logos* as primordial *word*. The will as *ex-sistent* belongs more to the *logos* than to itself (*zu-gehören*). This the will realizes in the act in which it receives the word of the *logos*, and *listens* to its call (*hören*). And it is precisely by *responding* to the binding criterion of the openness of Being that the will becomes resolve (*Entschlossenheit*) or authentic will. Any particular responsibility of man, therefore, is merely a participation in the existentialistic responsibility which defines the human will.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the human will is the primordial decision to respond to the voice of the *logos*, to disclose the openness of the world, and to let the totality of all that is reveal itself. The fact that Heidegger has deepened, elucidated and differentiated his early concept of the openness of the world, or for that matter his concept of the human will, does not in the least indicate a change or a break in his thought. In his earlier thinking about

the world he emphasized the referential totality of beings, later on he focused on the Nothingness of Being, and more recently he has brought the more differentiated concept of the "foursome" (*das Geviert*) to the forefront. The "foursome" is the interplay of earth, sky, gods and mortals. The letting-be of the foursome Heidegger calls *dwelling* (*wohnen*). Dwelling is the abiding of mortals on earth, their wandering under the sky, and their sojourning in togetherness with other mortals in the vicinity of the gods (Heidegger, 1954b, pp. 149, 150). From the very beginning, however, Heidegger has emphasized that man is not authentically man, and that he does not truly dwell on earth by conquering the world, but by guarding its Being. The authentic will, according to Heidegger (1947, p. 29), is not the will of man as the "superman," but the will of man as "the shepherd of Being."

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CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTS OF WILL, DECISION AND RESPONSIBILITY

ADRIAN VAN KAAM

Duquesne University

Introduction

It is my task to discuss the clinical implications of certain concepts of Martin Heidegger which were treated by the philosopher, Dr. Bernard Boelen, whose paper appears elsewhere in this issue. Before doing so I should like to consider briefly the difference between existential philosophy and psychology. A statement of this distinction may clarify the difference between the philosophical approach of Dr. Boelen and the psychological considerations of my paper.

The Difference between Existential Philosophy and Psychology

The psychologist as *psychologist* studies the fundamental structure and the primordial situation of man only in so far as they appear in and affect the observable behavior of people. The notions developed by the existential philosophers are for him, as an empirical scientist, hypothetical constructs from which testable propositions can be deduced and put to the empirical test. He uses them as integrational concepts for the development of a comprehensive theoretical psychology in the hope that they may provide an adequate frame of reference for the data which contemporary psychology and psychiatry have uncovered. As long as the outcome of research and observation does not contradict those constructs borrowed from the existential philosopher, he may maintain them as operationally useful; otherwise he will dismiss them.

The central hypothetical construct in existential psychology evolves from the notion of existence. This construct can be briefly formulated as the hypothesis that it is impossible to think of subject and world as separate from each other. The extraordinary usefulness of this and other concepts of existential psychology is due to the fact that they have emerged from the phenomenological description of the immediately observed psychological reality in its original wholeness and unity. Existential concepts facilitate the development of a *comprehensive* psychological theory because they symbolize the concrete totality of the psychology of man. These comprehensive constructs represent this psychological totality as it manifests itself before man's experience, measurable behavior, physiological functioning and social environment are split up verbally, conceptually and experiment-

ally. This split or abstraction is useful and necessary for the purpose of intensive detailed study and the development of single domain theories about each of them. But the construct, for instance, of ex-sistence or of man's being-in-the-world implies the original experience of man behaving bodily within his world in relationship to others. In other words, this term adequately reflects the real concrete totality of self, experience, behavior, body and environment. The comprehension of this notion enhances, therefore, the possibility of the evolvment of a fundamental frame of reference which may virtually integrate the rich variety of data and constructs which have been developed by psychologists who have explored physiological, experiential, measurable behavioral, sociological, pathological or other aspects abstracted from intentional-functional behavior.

It may be clear from this description that existential psychology, while leading to new experiments and applications, is not primordially an experimental or applied mode of psychology but may be best characterized as a recent development within the area of general theoretical psychology.

In other words existential psychology is *primordially* descriptive-theoretical-integrational and *secondarily* experimental and applied.

Theoretical psychology deals with the totality itself of the intentional-functional behavior of man, which under different aspects is studied by the various single domain psychologies such as experimental, psychoanalytical and phenomenological psychologies. Consequently, general theoretical psychology, like theoretical physics, deals in principle with the whole of the object pole of its science, and can never be experimental or applied in so far as the experimental or applied approach necessarily presupposes abstraction of certain aspects of the whole object pole which are selected as variables in the experiment or application concerned. General theoretical psychology is, however, *empirical* because it aims at the creation of scientific hypotheses by means of the crystallization of useful constructs which are implicit in phenomenological descriptions of experienced behavior. These constructs are obtained also by means of a comparative study of the contributions of experimental, physiological, social, clinical and psychoanalytical psychology and psychiatry. The existential psychologist thus studies the fundamental structure and primordial situation of man in so far as they reveal themselves in and affect observable behavior. The specific interest of the existential psychologist is not in the *ontological status* of the fundamental structure and primordial situation of man. Existential psychology as psychology, therefore, does not deal primordially with ontological and epistemological problems which are studied in existential philosophy. The psychologist can speak only about human experience as it appears in concrete behavior and behavioral products in concrete situations; he abstains from every absolute judgment

regarding the ontological reality of his object. For the psychologist can speak only about what he has observed and in so far as he has observed it. On the other hand, neither can the psychologist say that every knowledge of an object other than the psychological one, for example ontological knowledge, is impossible and worthless. For the empirical method of psychology can neither prove nor disprove this statement.

In the light of these principles of existential psychology as an integrational theory of empirical data, our discussion abstains from any ontological or epistemological evaluation of Heidegger's approach to will, decision and responsibility. It attempts only to evaluate his concepts as hypothetical constructs by relating them to clinical observation. In this dialogue between hypothetical constructs and clinical observation, the original meaning of the constructs may slightly change while being attuned to the clinical reality. This change of the original meaning of a construct is sometimes unavoidable in theoretical physics or theoretical psychology where observed tested reality is the final criterion. An example of this change of meaning of a construct during the dialogue between philosophical concepts and observed data is the development in theoretical physics of the hypothetical construct "atom" that was borrowed from the philosopher Democritus.

After this brief consideration of the specific scope and purpose of a psychological discussion of philosophical concepts, we are now ready to consider the concepts of Heidegger which have been presented by Dr. Boelen. We propose to consider these notions in the light of clinical experience obtained in the course of psychotherapy and to evaluate their relevance for the development of a theoretical psychology of man and of psychotherapy.

Existential Will and Psychotherapy

According to Heidegger, man discloses his true nature and possibilities by his participation in the event of Being. In the present discussion, we shall substitute the term reality, which is clinically more familiar to us, for the term Being. Probably most experienced psychotherapists would agree that their patients find and actualize themselves only when they are able again to participate spontaneously in the whole of reality as it reveals itself in their own personality and in their daily situation. The prime result of therapy is to enable the patient to be a spontaneous participant in life rather than a compulsive or withdrawn outsider who tries to do the impossible, that is, to take a vantage point outside himself from which he strives to control all that transpires in his life. In the course of therapy he will begin to experience that human life is necessarily ex-sistence or involvement, and that he encounters the world in which he is involved not by detached scientific reasoning only, but by becoming aware of, by owning, his spontaneous "lived" existential experiences which he has

repressed and which point to his reality, his world. He comes to realize that the self-manifestation of reality within his given physiological-psychological-environmental (cultural) reality cannot be of his own making and therefore escapes his anxious control. His reality posits itself as a challenge, an invitation to which he can respond in a variety of ways. In other words, the basic condition for healthy self-actualization is the openness of the patient for reality as it reveals itself, an authentic openness which does not repress any awareness which announces itself in the "lived" experience. Man can refuse to be open or he may be unable — crippled by neurotic or psychotic anxiety — to open up to all aspects of his reality to which his spontaneous experience points. In the first case he is called unethical; in the latter, neurotic or psychotic. At times he is a mixture of both, and it is not easy always to recognize whether a man is a victim of neurotic anxiety or of bad will. Was Eichmann, for example, open enough to the deeper meanings of reality to be aware of the unethical aspects of his enterprise? Or was he a person so estranged from his real human self that he could not deviate from the pattern of the Nazi collectivity and from the organizational duty imposed on his collectivized functional self by this collectivity? Was his attitude bad will or was it lack of the possibility to will because of an inability to experience in spontaneous openness all his feelings that were aroused by the sordid reality in which he was participating?

The fundamental will, the primordial option of man, is to be open to reality as it reveals itself or to close himself to reality. As soon as man opens up to what-is, reality reveals itself in ever increasing detail which implies an ever increasing challenge for man to respond in an authentic way. When a patient has opened up spontaneously to his whole reality in all its aspects, he will start to talk about numerous new insights regarding his daily relationships, feelings and obligations. He takes as it were a new stand, a new attitude towards the differentiated reality which appears in the light of his existential openness gained in the encouraging, secure atmosphere of therapeutic understanding.

It may be clear from these observations that all psychotherapy aims basically at the "Ent-schlossenheit," the openness, the resolve; it aims at the self-direction, the spontaneous willing openness of the patient for the reality which reveals itself in the "lived" experience.

The awakening of the existential will is the final object of psychotherapy. The crucial importance of this restoration of the existential openness or will makes it desirable to elucidate the structure of the human will not only in terms of ontology but also in the perspective of clinical experience. For the sake of brevity, I shall refer chiefly to the person who comes for psychotherapeutic assistance and refrain from discussion of the clinical implications

of Heidegger's analysis for the education of the "healthy" individual.

Authentic and Unauthentic Will

A first important distinction made by Heidegger is the distinction between unauthentic openness or will and authentic openness or will. Man lives in a concrete daily environment which has certain meanings already imposed on it by culture, subcultures, school and family. But the authentic man is not only living the meanings imposed by his environment; he transcends this limited meaningfulness imposed by the crowd by uncovering spontaneously and personally other meanings and possibilities that are present in the reality which he experiences. Man is always to a degree unauthentic in so far as he always has to participate to a degree in what his culture imposes. This is a necessary consequence of man's incarnation which means his presence in limited space and time. Man becomes wilfully unauthentic, however, when he "wills" no longer, is no longer open for the possibilities and meanings that transcend what the impersonal "one" praises as being good for him. In this case he cuts off his possibility of the discoverability of any other meaning in the reality which he encounters. It is precisely this inability to uncover personally other meanings which characterizes in various degrees psychotic and neurotic patients. The schizoid personality, for instance, has become a closed acosmic selfness in an attempt not to encounter threatening situations. But the fact that man's essence is his ex-sistence — in other words that man *has* to stand out — forces the schizoid person to develop a phantom world out of the remnants of reality. Research with catatonic patients has shown that even they stand out somehow in a world of illusions and hallucinations or even in perception of their surroundings.

Of course, the peculiar way in which authenticity or unauthenticity expresses itself is different and unique in each individual. It is in each case a unique expression of a common structure. Heidegger is interested in the disclosure of the basic characteristics of all human existence and not in the individual concrete form of these basic characteristics in the individual existence of single persons. Therefore, Heidegger's analysis is of great importance for the general theoretical psychologist who develops a comprehensive frame of reference for his science. For the psychotherapist, however, the *Existenzerhellung*, the illumination of individual existence or the study of the individuation of the common structure in single patients, is crucial too.

The Will as the Being-in-the-World

Let us now follow Heidegger in his further analysis of the "Being-in-the-World" or the spontaneous participation in reality.

For it is this "Being-in," this openness, resolve or existential will that is at stake in our patients. The healthy individual is not in his environment in the spatial sense in which a match is in a match box but, as Heidegger repeats, man's being-in-the-world is an active participation, a dwelling, cultivating, caring and sojourning. This will or openness, this commitment or involvement in reality is totally or partially inhibited in the patient. The human will, says Boelen, when authentic is characterized by *Befindlichkeit* or "primordial mood," *Verstehen* or "under-standing," and *Rede* or "discoursiveness."

The Will as Primordial Mood

The primordial mood of man is his being tuned in spontaneously to reality. It is this personal immediate feel of reality that is so weak in depressed or catatonic patients. This openness or primordial will of the healthy person increases his sensitivity to the differentiated manifestation of reality within himself and his environment. The patient, on the contrary, is selectively insensitive to reality. He refuses to be affected naturally and spontaneously by reality in its entirety. He does not engage himself totally and naively but withholds himself anxiously. The will or primordial openness for every message of what-is is the ground or source of all particular moods and feelings in the person. When a patient in the course of treatment opens up and dares to accept and own affective manifestations of reality in himself which he had suppressed formerly, he is faced with a whole new gamut of moods and feelings. Many sessions follow during which the patient faces the new feelings which arise on the basis of his enlarged openness for his reality. His new liberated sensitivity for reality differentiates itself during the sessions in particular sentiments of joy, anger, sadness, hostility, enthusiasm, which correspond with the aspects of reality in which he is involved and engaged.

Also the other Heideggerian connotation of his term *Befindlichkeit*, to-find-oneself, manifests itself as soon as the primordial openness or will has been activated by the patient during the therapeutic process. The true will, the genuine commitment of the self to reality, makes the patient discover implicitly that *he* acts, that *he* commits *himself*, that *he is a self*. He experiences at those moments that he is not merely what others imagine or what he imagines that the therapist would like him to be. The therapist is non-directive precisely in order to enable the patient to find himself instead of the self of the therapist. The fact that he can discover himself only when open to reality as it reveals itself helps the patient to become authentically social and individual at the same time. For he can now be social without losing himself, and he can be himself without rebelling unreasonably against society. To be sure, in the course of this process he may have to

rebel temporarily against his environment in order to experience the difference between his real self and the functional self imposed by his culture. But gradually he discovers that he can be reasonably social and at the same time be himself because the primordial will or human openness is embedded in collective, everyday social life but at the same time transcends everydayness. The patient in his process of self-discovery becomes aware of the fact that his fundamental, human, incarnated structure subjects him to the time-space limitations of a certain contemporary society within which he has to actualize himself in a socially acceptable manner. On the other hand, in his ability to uncover and to adhere to personal meanings in reality not presented by the collectivity to which he belongs, he becomes aware of his transcendency. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other discovery prevails, and near the end of therapy a subtle interplay between both poles of the human reality develops until a balance is reached.

That the openness or will of the patient is bound also to the unescapable reality of the collectivity leads us to the next implication of *Befindlichkeit*, namely that one *finds* oneself already in this world, with the emphasis on the term *finding*. In other words, the patient will have to realize, accept and face his "facticity," which implies among other things that he is "thrown" in the world and dependent on the manifestation of reality before, after and contemporaneous with his own existence. He is not the absolute master of his own existence. The awareness of this contingency normally evokes anxiety. In the healthy person who is able to face and accept his contingency in openness, this anxiety is pervaded by a peaceful, humble acceptance of this aspect of the human reality. But for the patient for whom frequently the first meeting with reality as represented by parents or other significant adults was an event that evoked more than normal anxiety, every awareness of contingency or of the possibility of non-being may arouse overwhelming anxiety. Normal anxiety makes the person realistically aware of his contingency and relative dependency. His awareness enables him to structure his life in a way that takes into account realistically this aspect of the human predicament. Therefore, normal anxiety is a necessary and useful announcement of one fundamental dimension of our human condition.

The Will as Control

In the light of Heidegger's elucidation of the *Befindlichkeit*, Dr. Boelen discusses the positivistic or rationalistic misconception of the will as self control. The patients who come to us in contemporary culture are frequently permeated by the positivistic and rationalistic distortions of the concept of the human will, which is considered as a positive "thing" that can control, like a super scientist or engineer, all other "things" in the person without

respect for their subtle complexity. Many patients unconsciously try to take a vantage point outside themselves and outside the situation in which they live. They are so taken up with attempting the impossible, namely to control and manipulate quasi-scientifically their relationships and their inner and outer behavior, that there is little room left for authentic openness to reality as it reveals itself only to its spontaneous participants. This means that they have not developed a real authentic self because the authentic self is the spontaneous involvement in, and the respectful listening and response to reality in all its manifestations.

Another positivistic explanation of the "thing-will," according to Dr. Boelen, is the control of the "unauthentic self" by the "authentic self." Many patients try in a schizoid way to distinguish between a completely isolated "higher" self which is out-of-this-world and which should repress, force and manipulate all the bodily space and time relationships with the environment without regard for the factual reality of the bodily incarnation in space and time.

Psychotherapy, however, creates conditions within which the patient feels free to develop an open dialogue with his time and space relationships in a respectful openness to their reality. By denying, repressing and defending himself against this concrete daily reality, the person closes himself from reality as it reveals itself and is out of tune with his own reality and the reality of his surroundings.

The whole therapeutic process can be described in terms of an increasing dialogue between the frightened, isolated, withdrawn self and its spatial-temporal modes of incarnation within concrete, everyday reality. This process leads to a realistic incarnation in which the unauthentic self becomes like a disciple listening respectfully without repression to the revelation of reality to the authentic self. The binding criterion becomes then reality which is freely uncovered in spite of anxiety for its demands. Instead of attempting to transform, to overpower, to distort essential or basic reality in himself and others, the authentic man lets essential reality be in all its fullness and variety. The opposite is the withdrawal from essential reality, which may end in autism, which is the death of authentic ex-sistence, of really standing-out into reality.

The Will as Understanding

After our clinical illustration of the first structural characteristic of the will, the *primordial mood*, we may now consider the second structural characteristic given by Heidegger, *Verstehen* (understanding). In the positivistic and rationalistic perception of man, there is an absolute opposition between the willing, striving, feeling on the one hand and cool, scientific understanding on the other. The psychotherapist, however, soon discovers that this

absolute distinction does not work. Being an empiricist, he rejected this positivistic-rationalistic distinction between willing and understanding long before the new insight broke through among contemporary philosophers. One can try, with scientifically neat arguments, to reason the patient into an understanding of his own predicament. But this process does not work so long as the primordial mood of the patient is not tuned in and his primordial will or openness is not awakened. As soon, however, as the patient overcomes, in the therapeutic relationship, the anxiety which inhibited his primordial will or open engagement in reality, he is more and more able to understand his reality personally and spontaneously without repression. This understanding of the patient reveals itself not only as a standing *under* reality but also as a *standing*, i.e., as taking a personal *stand* towards reality. For reality reveals itself always as loaded with possibilities to be actualized, potential meanings to be given and realized in action. It is the patient, and not his environment or the therapist, who has to take this personal stand and who has to uncover the personal meaning of his reality to himself. In other words, the primordial will evoked in therapy is at the same time an authentic openness for reality, an understanding of this reality and the taking of a personal stand towards this uncovered reality. The respectful co-understanding of the therapist fosters the creative process of understanding in the patient and therewith his courage to will. It is therefore the authentic will or the commitment to reality without repression in the patient which fosters the light of understanding. This understanding can never be forced or imposed on the patient by scientifically impeccable reasonings of the therapist. Neither is it therapeutic to try to cure the person by drawing certain life projects for him and to reason him scientifically into the acceptance of these projects. Every authentic plan or project of life presupposes the fundamental openness of ex-sistence in the patient which is created by his will as response to the self-manifestation of reality in his situation. Once this fundamental openness is actualized, the patient will unconceal himself better than any therapist. He will discover who he is and what unique, individual stand he should take. This unconcealment of self, this respectful openness that allows events, relationships and feelings to reveal themselves the way they are, is a never finished process. There is no such thing as final self-insight or a final analysis. Therapy aims primordially at the emergence or the recreation of the primordial will, of the freedom of engagement in reality, at the *fundamental readiness* to face reality as it reveals itself. Therapy may accompany the patient during the first experiences which emerge in this new openness. But then the time comes that the patient experiences that he dares to maintain his radical openness even without the secure, understanding presence of the therapist. Therefore, at the end of

therapy, the personal dialogue with the ever more differentiating self-manifestation of reality is not finished but begins.

The Will as Discoursiveness

This never finished dialogue with reality which the therapeutic relationship facilitated in the patient leads us to the third structural characteristic of the will, namely *Rede*, or discoursiveness. Here again we must go beyond the rationalistic notion of discourse. The therapist promotes discoursiveness in the patient not by elaborate discussions during which the therapist speaks most, but by creating conditions in which the patient is able to experience the differentiated, articulated or dialectical way in which reality manifests itself to him. It is not the therapist who tells the patient what his reality is; both patient and therapist listen in openness to what reality tells them. In a certain sense therapy is respectfully listening together. This willing openness which makes the patient listen to the multifarious manifestation of reality is at the same time a willingness to respond in differentiated actions, judgments and choices which correspond with the differentiation of reality discovered in this openness. The primordial will is therefore at the same time the source of the increasing theoretical and practical insights of the patient which become more realistic. When the end of therapy is near, the patient manifests more and more that he knows how to handle his situation theoretically and practically. In the beginning of therapy, the therapist may be impressed by the inadequate way in which the patient handles his life situations. The worst response to this inadequacy would be to present him with an outline according to which the patient should handle complex situations theoretically and practically. Such a procedure would first of all counteract the main aim of psychotherapy, the awakening of the existential will which is dormant. Secondly, it would not work because every single situation, no matter how similar to other situations, is always somewhat different. It is only a willing openness for reality as it reveals itself that is the source of the theoretical and practical insights which are in tune with this singular manifestation of reality which the patient meets in his life. The various functional decisions which the patient has to make in every single situation are only a secondary willing dependent on the openness of the primordial will. If functional or secondary willing is not dependent on the primordial will, but simply a function of what the therapist tells the patient to do, then his secondary, functional, false, unauthentic self is reinforced instead of weakened. The positivistic or rationalistic conception of the will is frequently a description of only the functional secondary will cut off from its source, the primordial will or existential openness. This notion, so predominant in our scientific culture, fosters dangerously a schizoid split in persons who are already disposed

this way because of organic causes and/or individual life history. Their real inner self with the primordial will becomes separated from their functioning in terms of the environment. Their secondary, functional, derived will becomes dominant and they lose their spontaneous responsibility (response-ability) to reality as it manifests itself to them in increasing differentiation. The split person is less and less able to respond intuitively to reality and more and more inclined to conform blindly to the collectivity. He develops a quasi-autonomous collective mode of ex-sistence that is less and less in touch with his primordial will and becomes therefore organized around a secondary, unauthentic functional will. In the meantime the anxious, withdrawn real self may foster a phantasy world to live in. In certain cases the split may lead to a sudden breakdown of the unauthentic functional will. Then the isolated real self and its world of phantoms manifests itself to the bewildered environment as the psychotic breakdown of a person who *functioned* so marvellously.

The Relevance of the Concept of Existential Will for a Theory of Psychotherapy

Our clinical consideration of Heidegger's approach to will, decision and responsibility as presented philosophically in the paper of Dr. Boelen suggests to us that Heidegger's ontological concepts can be made somehow useful as psychological constructs in the development of a psychological theory of man and especially of psychotherapy. Those constructs, however, have for us as *empirical scientists* only hypothetical value. For the limitations inherent in the empirical method do not permit us to evaluate their ontological status. Therefore we hope that experimentation will affirm or challenge various testable propositions which can be deduced from the general postulates which are implicit in our discussion. For instance, the outcomes of the research in psychotherapy under the auspices of Carl Rogers and Gene Gendlin at the University of Wisconsin, of John M. Butler and Laura N. Rice at the University of Chicago, and of Alice K. Wagstaff at Duquesne University do not seem to contradict these theoretical postulates. Experimental psychologists have to do for theoretical psychology what experimental physicists did for theoretical physics, for instance, when they deduced testable propositions from the untestable theory (as such) of relativity developed by the theoretical physicist Einstein and put them to the test. Only in this interaction between theoretical, experimental and applied psychology can psychology grow to a relatively unified science like physics.

Summary

The aim of this paper was to investigate the relevance of certain

existential constructs of Heidegger to a possible frame of reference for psychology and especially for psychotherapy. The radical difference between a philosophical and psychological view of the human structure and of the primordial human situation was considered. Then, the importance of a study of the human will for the psychologist and psychotherapist was discussed; the three main characteristics of the human will according to Heidegger were related to the experience of the psychotherapist. We found a relevance of these existential constructs to theoretical psychology and appealed therefore to the specialists in the experimental area of psychology for the deduction of testable propositions which can be put to experimental test.

WILL, DECISION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN BUBER

MAURICE FRIEDMAN

Sarah Lawrence College

Will

From his earliest teaching, Martin Buber has emphasized will "in all its contrariness and all its possibility" as the road to authentic existence. In contrast to Kant who identifies the "good will" with reason and who regards the inclinations as "sources of want" that "it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from," Buber sees will as the wholeness of the person, the unification of passion and direction. "The image of man toward which we strive," wrote Buber in 1919, "is one in which conviction and will, personality and its deed are one and indivisible." Each man discovers his particular way only through the knowledge of his essential quality and inclination, through perceiving his "central wish," the strongest feeling which stirs his inmost being. In many cases, moreover, he knows this central wish only in the form of the particular passion which seeks to lead him astray. Having lost touch with his "central wish," he encounters it as the "evil urge," the undirected passion which he has ignored or suppressed. If man lends his will to the direction of his passions, he begins the movement toward authentic existence in which "the total man is accepted, confirmed, and fulfilled. This is the true integration of man." So far from being evil, therefore, the "evil urge" is the raw material without which there can be no good. If the power of passion is regarded as an evil to be suppressed, then it will accumulate in the soul and turn negative and will frustrate the very fulfillment that direction and the conscious self desire (Friedman, 1960, cf. Chaps. 5, 6, 10-15, 21-22).

To use the "evil urge" as raw material for the good means to give one's will to profit and to be powerful direction through the "Will to enter into relation." Relation here means "I-Thou" — the direct, reciprocal, present relation between man and what comes to meet him as opposed to the indirect, non-mutual, relationship of "I-It." I-Thou is a dialogue in which the other is accepted in his unique otherness and not reduced to a content of my experience. I-It is a monologue, the subject-object relationship of knowing and using that does not allow the other to exist as a whole and unique person but abstracts, reduces, and categorizes. To say, as Buber does, that "all real living is meeting" does not mean that one is always in dialogue. "In subjectivity the spiritual substance of the person matures," and the desire is formed for ever fuller sharing in being.

I-Thou and I-It stand in a dialectic relationship to each other.

"The *It* is the eternal chrysalis, the *Thou* the eternal butterfly." In I-It only a part of one's being — rational, emotional, intuitive, sensory — enters into the relation; in I-Thou the whole being enters in. Correspondingly, Buber distinguishes between a will which represents the whole being and one which represents only a part of the being. The former is like the Taoist *wu-wei*, an action of the whole being that has the appearance of non-action because it does not intervene but goes out to meet one's destiny with the spontaneity of the whole person. The free man's will and the attainment of his goal need not be united by a means, for in I-Thou, the means and the end are one. "The free man has no purpose here and means there, which he fetches for his purpose: he has only the one thing, his repeated decision to approach his destiny." In contrast to the free man stands the man of arbitrary self-will who continually intervenes in order to use the outside world for his purposes. This does not mean that the free man acts only from within himself. On the contrary, it is only he who sees what is new and unique in each situation, whereas the unfree man sees only its resemblance to other things. But what comes to the free man from without is only the precondition for his action; it does not determine its nature. Both to immediate external events and to those social and psychological conditioning influences which he has internalized in the past, he responds freely from the depths as a whole and conscious person. The unfree person, on the other hand, is so defined by public opinion, social status, or his neurosis that he does not *respond* spontaneously and openly to what meets him but only *reacts*.

When the "will to power" is made a value in itself and divorced from the will to enter into relation, the inevitable result is the tendency to use others as means to one's ends. This is true even of the doctor and the psychotherapist who give others technical aid without entering into relationship with them. Help without mutuality is presumptuousness, writes Buber; it is an attempt to practice magic. "As soon as the helper is touched by the desire, in however subtle a form to dominate or to enjoy his patient, or to 'treat the latter's wish to be dominated or enjoyed by him as other than a wrong condition needing to be cured, the danger of falsification arises, beside which all quackery appears peripheral." For the therapist as for the teacher the distinction between arbitrary and true will rests on a quite real and concrete experiencing of the patient's or the pupil's side of the relationship. Only if he discovers the "otherness" of the patient or the pupil will the therapist or the teacher discover his own real limits and what is needed to help the person he is working with. He must see the position of the other in his concrete actuality yet not lose sight of his own, for only this will remove the danger that his will to heal or to educate will degenerate into arbitrariness.

Decision

"Martin Buber," writes the Swiss psychotherapist Hans Trüb (1952), "is for me the symbol of *continually renewed decision*."

He does not shut the mystery away in his individuality, but rather from out of the basic ground of the mystery itself he seeks binding with other men. He lets a soft tone sound and swell in himself and listens for the echo from the other side. Thus he receives the direction to the other and thus in dialogue he finds the other as his partner.

To Buber man is the only creature with true potentiality, and his decisions affect not only what he himself becomes but help determine the character of the future hour. Decisionlessness makes man divided and unfree, conditioned and acted upon. It is failure to direct one's inner power. Decision, in contrast, means transforming one's passion so that it enters with its whole power into the single deed. It is not a psychological event that takes place within man but the turning of the whole being through which one enters once again into dialogue. It is the awakening of the will to decision. We make freedom real to ourselves, says Buber, by forgetting all that is caused and making decision out of the depths. When we do this, destiny confronts us as the counterpart of our freedom. It is no longer our boundary but our fulfillment. At the very point when man has completely given over his life to the domination of the lifeless mechanism of world process, he can go forth with his whole being to meet the Thou. The one thing that can prevent this turning, says Buber, is the belief in fate — "the abdication of man before the exuberant world of *It*." In the modern world the "lived concrete" — the moment "in its unforeseeableness and... irrecoverableness... its undivertible character of happening but once" — is expropriated and dispossessed in four different ways. Through the historicizing of the moment it is regarded as a pure product of the past. Through the technicizing of the moment it is treated as purely a means to a goal and hence as existing only in the future. Through the psychologizing of the moment its total content is reflected upon and reduced to a process or experience of the psyche. Through the philosophizing of the moment it is abstracted from its reality. All work together to form a more tenacious and oppressive belief in fate or pure process than has ever existed. When this is so, sometimes it is only "the despair which shatters the prison of our latent energies" which enables us to make decision out of the depths, to accomplish the turning, the renewing revolution in the midst of the course of an existence.

Such decision means the transformation of the urges, of the "alien thoughts," or fantasy. We must not reject the abundance of this fantasy but transform it in our imaginative faculty and turn it into actuality. "We must convert the element that seeks to take possession of us into the substance of real life." The

contradictions which distress us exist only that we may discover their intrinsic significance. Good, then, is the decision of the whole being, evil the directionlessness that comes from failure to decide. "Evil cannot be done with the whole soul; good can only be done with the whole soul." Evil is not the result of a decision, for true decision is not partial but is made with the whole being. There can be no wholeness "where downtrodden appetites lurk in the corners" or where the soul's highest forces watch the action, "pressed back and powerless, but shining in the protest of the spirit."

"The man with the divided, complicated, contradictory soul is not helpless," writes Buber (1953, p. 128), "the core of his soul... is capable of... binding the conflicting forces together, amalgamating the diverging elements." This unification of the soul is never final, and what is achieved demands a total effort for its realization:

It is a cruelly hazardous enterprise, this becoming a whole... Everything in the nature of inclinations, of indolence, of habits, of fondness for possibilities which has been swashbuckling within us, must be overcome, and overcome, not by elimination, by suppression... Rather must all these mobile or static forces, seized by the soul's rapture, plunge of their own accord, as it were, into the mightiness of decision and dissolve within it.

It is no wonder, writes Buber, that these situations frequently terminate in a persistent state of indecision. Yet even if the effort of unification is not entirely successful, it may still lay the groundwork for future success. "The unification must be accomplished *before* a man undertakes some unusual work," but any ordinary work that a man does with a united soul acts in the direction of new and greater unification and leads him, even if by many detours, to a steadier unity than he had before. "Thus man ultimately reaches a point where he can rely upon his soul, because its unity is now so great that it overcomes contradiction with effortless ease." In place of his former great efforts all that is now necessary is a relaxed vigilance. (1958a)

If true decision can only be made with the whole being and if it is decision, in turn, which brings the person to wholeness, this wholeness is never for Buber a goal in itself but only the indispensable base for going out to meet the Thou. Decision is made *with* the whole being, but it takes place *in* relation. The man who decides continually leaves the world of It for the world of relation in which I and Thou freely confront each other in mutual effect, unconnected with causality. It is in relation, therefore, that true decision takes place. "Only he who knows relation and knows about the presence of the *Thou* is capable of decision. He who decides is free, for he has approached the Face." This decision within relation means the direction of one's passion: it is a corollary of personal unification:

Two alternatives are set side by side — the other, the vain idea and the one, the charge laid on me. But now realization begins in me. For it is not decision to do the one and leave the other a lifeless mass, deposited layer upon layer as dross in my soul. But he alone who directs the whole strength of the alternative into the doing of the charge, who lets the abundant passion of what is rejected invade the growth to reality of what is chosen — he alone who serves God with the "evil impulse" makes decision, decides the event... If there were a devil it would not be one who decided against God, but one who, in eternity, came to no decision. (Buber, 1958b, p. 51 f.)

In *Images of Good and Evil* (1953, pp. 125–128) Buber, modifies this statement of *I and Thou* by distinguishing between a first stage of evil as decisionlessness and a second, radical stage of evil in which one actually decides for evil. In the first stage man intensifies and confirms his indecision. He grasps at every possibility "in order to overcome the tension of omnipossibility" and thus makes incarnate a "capriciously constructed indeterminate reality." He "plays with possibility" and this self-temptation leads again and again to violence. Man becomes aware of possibility, writes Buber, "in a period of evolution which generally coincides with puberty without being tied to it." This possibility takes the form of possible actions which threaten to submerge him in their swirling chaos. To escape from this dizzy whirl the soul either sets out upon the difficult path of bringing itself toward unity or it clutches at any object past which the vortex happens to carry it and casts its passion upon it. In this latter case, "it exchanges an undirected possibility for an undirected reality, in which it does what it wills not to do, what is preposterous to it, the alien, the 'evil'." It breaks violently out of the state of undirected surging passion "wherever a breach can be forced" and enters into a pathless maze of pseudo-decision, a "flight into delusion and ultimately into mania."

The actual decision to evil arises from the crisis of the self which makes the person's psychic dynamic secretive and obdurate. The repeated experiences of indecision merge in self-knowledge into "a course of indecision," a fixation to it. "As long as the will to simple self-preservation dominates that of being-able-to-affirm oneself," this self-knowledge is repressed. But when the will to affirm oneself asserts itself, man calls himself in question. For Buber's philosophical anthropology man is the creature of possibility who needs confirmation by others and by himself in order that he may be and become the unique person that he is. Through the two basic movements of distancing and entering into relation man is able to recognize himself and others as independent selves between whom dialogue may again and again arise. Men confirm each other through making the other present — "imagining the real": through making the other present I grasp him as a self; through knowing himself made present he becomes himself. "For the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, as people like to suppose today, in man's relation to himself" (Buber, 1957, ff. 101). Only if he is confirmed in his uniqueness

can a man realize his unique potentialities. When a man has become a self in dialogue with other selves, however, he may in a pinch do without the confirmation of others, but not that of himself. When a person's self-knowledge demands inner rejection, he either falls into a pathologically fragile and intricate relationship to himself, re-adjusts self-knowledge through that extreme effort of unification called "conversion," or displaces his knowledge of himself by an absolute self-affirmation. This self-affirmation in no sense means real personal wholeness but just its opposite — a crystallized inner division. "They are recognizable, those who dominate their own self-knowledge, by the spastic pressure of the lips, the spastic tension of the muscles of the hand and the spastic tread of the foot." In the second stage man affirms what he has time and again recognized in the depths of self-awareness as that which should be negated and says, "What I say is true because I say it," "What I do is good because I do it" (Buber, 1953, p. 136 ff.).

Essential to the understanding of Buber's treatment of will and decision is his concept of direction. "Direction" has never been for Buber simply something inner or something outer but the meeting of the two. In direction, according to Buber's early work *Daniel* (1913), the soul does not order reality but opens and delivers itself to it, and not with the senses and understanding alone but with its whole being. Direction is thus a finding of one's own way and a realization of one's inmost being that gives one the strength to withstand in openness the confused stream of outer and inner happenings. It is neither determinism nor arbitrary self-will. It does not exclude one from fellowship with others but makes possible true community, from being to being. When the man who has direction comes to a crossroads, he makes his choice with immediate decision as out of a deep command. The "orienting man" places all happening in formulas, rules, and connections; the "realizing man," in contrast, relates each event to nothing but its own intrinsic value.¹

In Buber's later thought he links direction with the individual's created uniqueness, with his "awareness of what he 'really' is, of what in his unique and non-repeatable created existence he is intended to be." It is this inner awareness of what one is meant to be that enables one to make a genuine decision. This is a reciprocal process, however, for in transforming and directing one's undirected energies, one comes to recognize ever more clearly what one is meant to be. One experiences one's uniqueness as a designed or performed one, intrusted to one for execution, yet everything that affects one participates in this execution. The person who knows direction responds with the whole of his being

¹ For a precis and discussion of *Daniel* in English see Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*, "Philosophy of Realization," Chap. 6, pp. 35—39.

to each new situation with no other preparation than his presence and his readiness to respond. The awareness of direction comes into being only in the dialogue itself: direction is neither conscious conception nor subconscious fantasy but the primal awareness of one's unique way that lies at the very center of one's awareness of oneself as I, and this awareness only comes in dialogue with a Thou. One discovers "the mystery waiting for one" not in oneself but in the encounter with what one meets. Each moment's new and unique direction is *the* direction if reality is met in lived concreteness.

Buber's concept of will and decision is like psychoanalytic "sublimation" in that it makes creative use of basic energies rather than suppressing them. But it differs from sublimation, as it is conceived by Freud, in that this channeling of the urges takes place as a by-product of the I-Thou relationship rather than as an essentially individual event in which the individual uses his relationship with other beings for his own self-realization. Freud's sublimation takes place *within* man, Buber's direction *between* man and man. In therapy itself, to Buber, it is will and decision within dialogue that is decisive. Therapy should not proceed from the investigation of individual psychological complications, he states, but from the whole man, for it is only the understanding of wholeness as wholeness that can lead to the real transformation and healing of the individual and of his relations with his fellow-men. None of the phenomena of the soul is to be placed in the center of observation as if all the rest were derived from it. The person ought not be treated as an object of investigation and encouraged to see himself as an "It." He should be summoned "to set himself to rights," to bring his inner being to unity so that he may respond to the address of being that faces him. The unconscious, to Buber, is not, as Freud thought, a psychic deep-freeze, from which repressed psychic ideas may be transferred into consciousness through the midwifery of the psychoanalyst. It is that wholeness of the being that precedes the articulation into the psychic and the physical, and as such one never knows it in itself but only in the meeting between patient and therapist. Not only must dreams and free association be understood in the light of this meeting but therapy itself. Therapy, for Buber, is not successful transference: it is "healing through meeting."

Responsibility

The characteristic of both Buber's personality and his work, according to the German educator Karl Wilker, is "the greatest conceivable consciousness of responsibility." Buber came to this responsibility through what he himself describes as a "conversion." Once after a morning of mystical ecstasy he was visited by a young man to whom he was friendly and attentive but not really present in spirit. When he later learned that the young

man had come to him for a decision of life and death, he experienced this event as a judgment.

Since then I have given up the "religious" which is nothing but the exception, extraction, exaltation, ecstasy; or it has given me up. I possess nothing but the everyday out of which I am never taken... I know no fullness but each mortal hour's fullness of claim and responsibility (Buber, 1955, p. 13 f.).

True existence is accessible only to the man who accepts responsibility for that circle of creation in which he is set — the soil he tills, the tools he uses, the animals and men with whom he has to do. "All power is intrinsically powerlessness," writes Buber, "unless it maintains this secret covenant with near and yet strange being." It is responsibility which gives direction to the evil urge. No renunciation of the object of desire is commanded: in his dialogue with others and in his life with the community it is possible for man to divert fear, anger, love, and sexual desire from the casual to the essential.

Freedom to Buber is only of value as a springboard for responsibility and communion. In our time, when the legitimacy of all traditional bonds has been questioned, freedom tends to be exalted into the goal. The true meaning of being free of a bond, however, is "that a quite personal responsibility takes the place of one shared with many generations. Life lived in freedom is personal responsibility or it is a pathetic farce." One cannot turn responsibility into responsibility to the self, as Sartre does when he defines value as the meaning of life which the individual chooses:

One can believe in and accept a meaning or value... (writes Buber in criticism of Sartre) if one has discovered it, not if one has invented it. It can be for me an illuminating meaning, a direction-giving value, only if it has been revealed to me in my meeting with being, not if I have freely chosen it for myself from among the existing possibilities (Buber, 1957b, p. 70).

Responsibility, to Buber, means *response* — response to what comes to meet you, to what you become aware of as addressing you and demanding from you an answer. "The idea of responsibility is to be brought back from the province of specialized ethics," writes Buber, "of an 'ought' that swings free in the air, into that of lived life. Genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding." Responsibility means entering into the unique situation and subduing it "into the substance of lived life."

Only then, true to the moment, do we experience a life that is something other than a sum of moments. We respond to the moment, but at the same time we respond on its behalf, we answer for it. A newly-created concrete reality has been laid in our arms; we answer for it. A dog has looked at you, you answer for its glance, a child has clutched your hand, you answer for its touch, a host of men moves about you, you answer for their need (1955, p. 17).

One may not reduce or select from the hour that is entrusted to one. One must answer for it in all its "wild and crude profaneness," in all "its apparently senseless contradiction, without weakening the impact of otherness in it." Responsibility presupposes that one is addressed by and answers to a realm independent of oneself. True love, accordingly, is not an emotion within man but the dialogue between man and man; feelings are only the accompaniment of that dialogue. Love, writes Buber, is "the responsibility of an *I* for a *Thou*."

Responsibility does not mean the choice between *I* and *Thou*, between the self and the world, but the affirmation of both. Not renunciation of power but responsibility in the exercise of power prevents it from becoming evil. This affirmation "requires constant demarcation of one's own right from the right of others. Such demarcation cannot be made according to rules valid once and for all" but only through "hourly acting with a continually repeated sense of responsibility." In order to be responsible, it is essential that we make use of that "disciplined fantasy" that enables us to experience the other person's side of the relationship. Only through a quite concrete imagining of what the other is thinking, feeling, and willing can I make him present to myself in his wholeness, unity, and uniqueness. This "imagining the real" is not "empathy" for it does not mean giving up one's own standpoint in order to enter that of the other. Rather it is a living partnership in which "I stand in a common situation with the other and expose myself vitally to his share in the situation as really his share." Without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of one's own activity, I "at the same time live through the common event from the standpoint of the other." This "inclusion" of the other takes place most deeply and fully in marriage, the "exemplary bond" which, if it is real, leads to a "vital acknowledgement of many-faced otherness — even in the contradiction and conflict with it." In all human relations, in fact, the responsible quality of one's decision will be determined by the degree to which one really "sees the other" and makes him present to one. "Experiencing the other side" is for this reason of significance not only for ethical action, but for love, friendship, teaching, and psychotherapy.

Responsibility means that one not only meets the *Thou* but that one holds one's ground when one meets it. In existential thinking man vouches for his word with his life and stakes his life in his thought. "Only through personal responsibility," writes Buber, "can man find faith in the truth as independent of him and enter into a real relation with it." One pledges oneself to the truth and confirms it by being true oneself. Buber changes Kierkegaard's category of the Single One from the "knight of faith" who lives in lonely relation with God to the man who lives in responsibility. This responsibility does not exclude man from membership in a group or community, but it means that true

membership in a community includes a *boundary* to membership so that no group or person can hinder one's perception of what is spoken or one's answer from the ground of one's being.

In contrast to the man of our age who is intent on escaping from the demanding "ever anew" of such responsibility by a flight into the protective "once-for-all," the great character "satisfies the claim of situations out of deep readiness to respond with his whole life, and in such a way that the sum of his actions and attitudes expresses at the same time the unity of his being in its willingness to accept responsibility." The great character acts from the whole of his substance and reacts in accordance with the uniqueness of every situation. The situation "demands nothing of what is past. It demands presence, responsibility; it demands you." This responsibility is never a maxim that addresses you in the third person or a habit. It is the unique situation which calls forth the personal command that has remained latent in a basic layer of your substance and now reveals itself to you in a concrete way.

In "What Is Common To All" Buber sets Heraclitus' injunction, "One should follow the common," in contrast with Taoist, Hindu, and modern mystical teachings which Buber characterizes as a flight from "the arch reality out of which all community stems — human meeting." This "flight from the common cosmos into a special sphere that is understood as the true being is... a flight from the existential claim on the person who must authenticate himself" in the "essential We." "It is a flight from the authentic spokenness of speech in whose realm a response is demanded, and response is responsibility." Aldous Huxley's counsel to the use of the mescaline drug, writes Buber, is the attempt to escape from the responsibility of the essential We into a chemical paradise of situationlessness in which one has no relation to other persons. (Buber, 1958c; cf. Buber, 1957c)

Every man hides, like Adam, to avoid rendering accounts, says Buber. "To escape responsibility for his life, he turns existence into a system of hideouts." The lie displaces "the undivided seriousness of the human person with himself and all his manifestations" and destroys the good will and reliability on which men's life in common rests. Guilt is failure to answer the unique call of the concrete hour with the unique response of the whole being. "Original guilt consists in remaining with oneself." Buber agrees with Heidegger that there is primal guilt; yet we do not discover this guilt, as Heidegger thinks, through isolating that part of life "where the existence is related to itself," but through "becoming aware of the whole life without reduction, the life in which the individual... is essentially related to something other than himself." It is just here, in the real guilt of the person who has not responded to the legitimate claim and address of the world, that the possibility of transformation and healing in psychotherapy lies. True guilt is not neurotic, tormented self-preoccupation but

an ontic reality that takes place *between* man and man. It does not reside in the person; he stands in it. Similarly, the repression of guilt and the neuroses which result from this repression are not merely psychological phenomena but real events between men. Real guilt is the beginning of *ethos*, or responsibility, writes Hans Trüb. Through it the psychotherapist may prepare the way for the resumption of the interrupted dialogue between the patient and the community in which the patient enters anew into a responsible relationship with his community.

Neurotic guilt-feeling is a subjective reality within the person, usually unconscious and repressed. "Existential guilt," in contrast, transcends the realm of inner feelings and of the self's relation to itself, and it is consciously remembered, even if its character as guilt is lost. Existential guilt is "guilt that a person has taken on himself as a person and in a personal situation," the corollary of the answerability and responsibility of the self in the concrete dialogical situation. "Existential guilt occurs when someone injures an order of the human world whose foundations he knows and recognizes as those of his own existence and of all common human existence." This "order of the human world" is not an objective absolute existing apart from man: it is the interhuman itself, the genuine We, the common logos and cosmos. The objective relationship in which each man stands toward others and through which he is able to expand his environment (*Umwelt*) into a world (*Welt*) "is his share in the human order of being, the share for which he bears responsibility."

The therapist may lead the man who suffers from existential guilt to the place where he himself can walk the road of illuminating that guilt, persevering in his identification of himself as the person who took on that guilt, and, in so far as his situation makes possible, restoring "the order of being injured by him through the relation of an active devotion to the world." Through this the therapist helps the patient to break through his self-encapsulation and opens a transformed, healed relationship "to the person who is sick in his relations to otherness — to the world of the other which he cannot remove into his soul" (Buber, 1957d).

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WILL AND WILLFULNESS IN HYSTERIA

LESLIE H. FARBER

Washington, D. C.

Introduction

Early in Freud's career as psychoanalyst he suffered a spell of rapture in which he boasted to Fliess that he could cure every case of hysteria. Though he was now in his middle years, this exuberance still belonged to his therapeutic youth — a time when his medical past still suffused and shaped his view of psychology. If at this stage the strategies of psychotherapy seemed as specific as a scalpel, hysteria was for him literally a hidden abscess bloated with the debris of sexual trauma — an abscess which must be located, then opened to consciousness, before the systemic symptoms of this malady would disappear. (It is my impression that most psychoanalysts have passed through this phase of development, although it must be admitted a few have lingered here unconscionably long.) For Freud, at least, little time passed before he inflicted such drainage on an abscess of hysteria — only to discover his patient shared neither his enthusiasm nor his optimism. In fact, after only a few weeks, she ended this treatment, never to return. His account of this therapeutic disaster contains one of the most anguished statements in the literature of psychology — a *cri du coeur* which must have helped him to leave his medical youth behind him.

(She) had listened to me without any of her usual contradictions. She seemed to be moved; she said good-bye to me very warmly, with the heartiest wishes for the New Year, and — came no more... I knew (she) would not come back again. Her breaking off so unexpectedly, just when my hopes of a successful termination of the treatment were at their highest, and her thus bringing those hopes to nothing — this was an unmistakable act of vengeance on her part. Her purpose of self-injury also profited by this action. No one who, like me, conjures up the most evil of those half-tamed demons that inhabit the human breast, and seeks to wrestle with them, can expect to come through the struggle unscathed. Might I perhaps have kept the girl under my treatment if I myself had acted a part, if I had exaggerated the importance to me of her staying on, and had shown a warm personal interest in her — a course which, even after allowing for my position as her physician, would have been tantamount to providing her with a substitute for the affection she longed for? I do not know. Since in every case a portion of the factors that are encountered under the form of resistance remains unknown, I have always avoided acting a part, and have contented myself with practising the humbler arts of psychology. In spite of every theoretical interest and of every endeavour to be of assistance as a physician, I keep the fact in mind that there must be some limits set to the extent to which psychological influence may be used, and I respect as one of these limits the patient's own *will and understanding* (*italics mine*).

Within this outcry can be discerned the frantic flailings of spirit which would declare to the world the pain this perverse creature had inflicted on him and at the same time give rational form to his outrage. It is despair which demands that she be charged both with the cunning to know his "hopes... were at their highest" and the meanness to shatter these hopes. Equally understandable is the simultaneous conviction, barely skirting the edges of self-pity and self-aggrandizement, that such catastrophes must be the penalty for ventures as heroic as his. At this point his pain subsides, the rhetorical scale diminishes, and he turns to reason for consolation and even instruction, seeking an order and detachment which so far have eluded him. Almost as if he had now forgotten his violent description of her impact on him, in his new mood he wonders if he might not have deliberately "exaggerated" to her the importance of her remaining in treatment. But he could not countenance such pretense on his part. Almost safely past the claims of indignation, he can now hope — in the teeth of what has just occurred — that he has always contented himself with "practising the humbler arts of psychology." He can acknowledge that there are limits to psychological influence. And precisely here he comes to a glimmering of the truth about his experience with Dora: "I respect as one of these limits (of psychological influence) the patient's own *will and understanding*." In other words, regardless of the inventiveness and accuracy with which he and Dora have traced the origins and meanings of her disorder, there is a force in her which says No to this mutual creation. To this force he gave the name allotted it by history, namely Will. At the same time he simultaneously — even paradoxically — ruled this traditional category out of bounds. But did this mean that henceforth the Will, as it has been understood by the ages, was to be excluded from his psychological considerations? Not entirely. In his postscript to the case of Dora, his anguish had subsided to the extent that he could more calmly consider his therapeutic failure:

I have been obliged to speak of transference, for it is only by means of this factor that I can elucidate the peculiarities of Dora's analysis. Its great merit, namely, the unusual clarity which makes it seem so suitable as a first introductory publication, is closely bound up with its great defect, which led to its being broken off prematurely. I did not succeed in mastering the transference in good time... In this way the transference took me unaware, and, because of the unknown quantity in me which reminded Dora of Herr K., she took her revenge on me as she wanted to take her revenge on him. ...If cruel impulses and revengeful motives, which have already been used in the patient's ordinary life for maintaining her symptoms, become transferred on to the physician during treatment, before he has had time to detach them from himself by tracing them back to their sources, then it is not to be wondered at if the patient's condition is unaffected by his therapeutic efforts.

In other words he no longer recognizes the "limits... to which psychological influence may be used" — will and understanding — and instead is elaborating his theories of transference which were to prove so significant for therapy. However, "tracing... cruel impulses and revengeful motives... back to their sources" is not quite the same as considering the psychology of will itself. In fact it could be said that Freud in his postscript chose to limit himself to a fragment of the problem of will: its motivations. And what he thought these motivations to be is clearly stated in the same postscript: "I was further anxious to show that sexuality... provides the motive power for every single symptom, and for every single manifestation of a symptom. The symptoms of the disease are nothing else than *the patient's sexual activity*" (italics Freud's). Thus, as was so often the case with Freud, the problem of will was equated with the motive of sexuality. For every act a variety of motives can be adduced — anxiety, sex, ambition, prestige, aggression, etc. — but even if we grant their validity as motives, their temporal priority cannot automatically endow them with ontological nor psychological superiority to the act itself. A motive cannot explain an act; the act ultimately must be judged in its own terms. Though we must be grateful for the second glance which permitted Freud to develop his theories of transference, I should like to suggest that his first impassioned outcry caught more of the truth about hysteria.

Hysteria and Willfulness

My thesis is that hysteria is a particular disorder of will whose principal expression is *willfulness*. By willfulness I do not mean mere intentionality or determination, which are older definitions of the term. I am using here the dictionary's more contemporary definition, namely "governed by will, without yielding to reason; obstinate; perverse; stubborn; as a willful man or horse." This definition suggests that in willfulness the life of the will becomes distended, overweening, and obtrusive at the same time that its movements become increasingly separate, sovereign, and distinct from other aspects of spirit. And with distension of will which is relatively unrelieved, intellect is bound to suffer. I mean, of course, intellect in the large sense, including not only will's usual adversary, which is reason, but also imagination, humor, discretion, judgment. In willfulness, then, will pursues its own tyrannical course with reckless disdain for what we usually mean by content, unless that content be will itself.

In willfulness "the will does the work of the imagination." Though rather quaint and crude, no better example of this situation exists than that bizarre occasion called hypnosis in which hysteric-as-hypnotist barter with hypnotist-as-hysteric, making it impossible to say at any given moment who is Trilby. It could

be argued that hypnosis is one of hysteria's necessary and characteristic inventions. Even the persistence of its early 19th century trappings — though the cloak and flowing tie have been replaced by a business suit — testifies to the intransigent, mindless quality of hysteria's inventiveness, which stays so indifferent to historical context. So little, really, has the form of hypnosis changed that it would seem to be lifted bodily from the pages of a gothic novel of the period. Let us remember that at the same time Mesmer was discovering Nature's magnetic forces within himself. Shelley was augmenting his own powers by merging with the west wind. "Be thou, spirit fierce, my spirit!" he cried. "Be thou me, impetuous one!" The prime quality of that romantic movement, according to Allen Tate, was "the momentary illusion of individual power." "The romantic," wrote Tate, "ranged over nature in the effort to impose his volitional ego as an absolute on the world."

The illusions of absolute power and absolute compliance which occupy hypnosis are necessarily momentary and fragile, quickly dispelled by the intrusions of life or psychotherapy, which is why they seem to be reserved largely for hypnosis and why hypnosis itself seems so unlike anything else in life. And to maintain these illusions requires the unflagging will of both parties, will here meaning the "willful suspension of disbelief." The first events of hypnosis, which usually consist of the hypnotist's exploitation of such items as gravity, muscular fatigue and inertia, are seldom questioned by the subject, but are arbitrarily attributed to the hypnotist's powers. And just as much as the subject, a "good" hypnotist will resist, for the moment, any rational formulation of these events, since his dramatic or hypnotic effectiveness hinges on his *own* belief in his powers. Qualities suggesting the "merely human," such as self-consciousness, doubt, humor, in either the hypnotist or subject, are inimical to the pact of hypnosis, which must be irrational and romantic to succeed. In Melville's sense, each participant should be a Confidence Man: i.e., a man who has confidence. It is understandable why, in terms of development, hypnosis is apt to be a youthful absorption of the psychiatrist, most passionately embraced during the period when his skills are least formed. Hypnosis becomes one willful way of overriding the despair of the young psychiatrist, qualified neither by age nor humanity to give counsel. At this stage in life, the romanticism of science rather than the science of romanticism urges him to dip into Nature for the verification of his own powers. Once the hypnotist begins to lose his belief, it will not be long before the spectacle strikes him as comic, for — retrospectively at least — outbursts of will are apt to appear more comic than pathetic because of the unadorned combination of presumption and ignorance.

Once isolated as willfulness, the will can no longer step outside itself, so that its inventiveness must be within its own terms.

While willfulness may seize other categories, under its dominion these categories lose their original substance, serving only as illusions of themselves. It has been said that hysteria and hypnosis have been used to prove every possible psychological theory including psychoanalysis. But of course under the sway of the two parent illusions of hypnosis — absolute power and absolute compliance — what is apt to be proved is the power of hypnosis rather than any particular theory of psychopathology. Although the theories contrived may be wildly different in form, they are invariably coercive in nature, describing how the will of the child is assaulted by the will of the parents. Thus the will invents in its own image. You undoubtedly recall that Freud first took quite literally his hysterical patients' tales of early seduction, later discovering that these episodes were more in the realm of fantasy. Eventually he managed to reconcile this error with his previous theories about sexuality. But what he failed to note was that in either case the will had contrived its own willful theory. As I will mention again in a few moments, no phase of existence is so easily appropriated to the needs of will as sexuality. But both erotic adventures which are invented and those that are lived must be read allegorically as episodes in willfulness, so that form will not be mistaken for content, expression for cause. It is precisely this confusion that has led to several errors about hysteria which still persist today, even though our therapeutic experience refutes them. Because the hysteric is so absorbed with sexual drama, in fact and in fantasy, and because he brings this form of willfulness almost immediately into the therapeutic situation, it has been assumed that such sexual freedom entitled hysteria to a top position in the libidinal hierarchy. The fact of the matter, as most therapists will agree, is that hysteria deserves no such rank, remaining one of the most incorrigible states taxing the therapist. Another common assumption, equally mistaken, was the belief that with sexual emancipation, hysteria would disappear. In point of fact, sexual emancipation — and the spread of physiological and anatomical knowledge — have merely diminished the cruder conversion manifestations. It was often the case that the hysteric, in stress, might in a sense exert the same absolute dominion over his own body that he exerted over others. What he would not move was paralyzed; what he would not hear deafened him; what he would not see blinded him. The hysteric's peremptory dealings with his own body would resemble the changes wrought by the hypnotist on the person of his subject; and in both cases the signals for these impositions could be as arbitrary as the numbers from 1 to 10.

Before sexual emancipation willfulness in sex was restricted to whether the person would or wouldn't. With emancipation willfulness shifted from the fact of participation to an absorption with the details of the sexual act itself. It is a larger arena we have built for the hysteric and the rules are more complicated,

now that sexual performance has been atomized, each particle exploitable. When Freud called a spade a spade to Dora, giving the sexual functions their clinical appellations, he offered Dora a new range of metaphor, if her vocabulary was that of the usual woman of her class. Nor was fresh metaphor all he offered, for his theory of symbolism gave even her ordinary expressions and activities sexual importance. It may be asked, however, whether such exegesis constitutes emancipation. Or whether, instead, the means of expression are merely extended. To put it another way, possibly more exactly, what Freud may have achieved was a change from the method of concealment to that of disclosure, without necessarily altering the motivation.

External Manifestations of Hysteria

The manner of hysteria, viewed critically from outside the experience of the beholder, will usually be described with adjectives derived more from theater than psychology. "Dramatic" or "histrionic," used pejoratively, are the terms most commonly invoked to convey the hysteric's impact. They suggest a repertoire of personal decoration, gesture, intonation, even vocabulary, whose flourish puts more modest or commonplace devices of expressiveness to shame, and is disproportionate to the spoken or written message. If a choice can be made between the physical and psychic realms, this repertoire belongs more to the former even though it uses psychic materials. When this dramatic insistence becomes too overpowering, whatever intellectual substance there may be is blurred for the listener, whose attention finds itself split in a manner not unlike the division in the hysteric. In such fragmentation listening, in any honorable sense, is no longer possible. Instead, mannerisms of body and voice, formerly inconspicuous, acquire a new and crude existence, widely separated from what is said. As the beholder's attention hesitates between these two poles, the possibility of any fully imaginative response recedes: he must now choose between style and content, such choice necessarily involving his own will. Inevitably, now, he compels himself, whether in agreement or disagreement, to address himself to the hysteric's manner. Thus does it happen that will responds to will and dialogue can be no more than illusion.

In an absolute — or dialogic — sense, in which manner and content can be separated only arbitrarily, hysterical drama may be said to be bad drama. Everyone has his own style of expression. Even the deadpan "objective" approach, in its seeming absence of style, intends to accord "scientific" or "sensible" or "unemotional" substantiation to a statement. Yet for most people their dramatic style will have an intimate though wavering bearing on their thought, sometimes one and sometimes the other being in the ascendancy — still without the connection being lost.

It is quite possible for very little to be said extravagantly well, in which case the listener may be persuaded he has heard more than he can later remember at a moment when the speaker's manner has faded from his recollection: "I can't remember what he said but he had a most charming way of expressing himself." Here the important word, of course, is "himself," for when the disproportion is great, when manner turns so topheavy as to be called hysterical, personal style in its self-assertiveness enhances not the idea so much as the beauty, brilliance, manliness of its author.

"Flirtatious," "coquettish," "seductive," would describe hysterical behavior where the drama is apparently sexual. Apparently, because were it clearly sexual, the adjectives would no longer apply. The seducer suggests his availability without quite acknowledging his intention. Thus, his manner will consist of persuasive or coercive nudgings, hardly overt enough for an overture, for extorting sexual commitment. While these stratagems may be unacknowledged, it would be improper to call them "unconscious." Let us say their recognition would impose a problem in morality which might diminish the excitement of the campaign. Recognition is postponed rather than repressed. The theory that the stratagems themselves are witless manifestations of dark sexual forces — puppets whose strings are pulled by the libido — is welcomed by the hysteric because it absolves him of willful intent. He is *acted upon* by Nature who works her will on him. So long as both wills — his and Nature's — reside within his person, there can be no defeat; victory is his, whatever the outcome. Though the defeat of his will may have, in reality, brought him to treatment, this theory offers him a way of viewing that defeat as a victory for Nature's will, an outcome not too uncommon in the speculations of the 19th century. Returning to seduction, once the partner commits himself sexually, the will may find another goal in fending off that commitment. The will's nimbleness in shifting goals has been aptly called "teasing," the organ prefix depending on the sex of the partner. As I mentioned earlier, with the immanentization of sex — through sexology and psychoanalysis — the will's opportunities have increased, now appropriating the details of sexual union. In an age to some extent characterized by "the tyranny of the orgasm," the choice is no longer between sex or no sex; instead the will joins itself to those particles of sexual behavior, whose sum — it is hoped — will constitute the sexual act. When this particular absorption with the willful possibilities of sex occurs at the feverish beginnings of psychotherapy it is apt to be called "positive transference" and mistakenly considered a good omen for cure. During this phase, before the two wills begin to oppose each other, the hysteric makes sexuality out of the therapist's science while the therapist makes science out of sexuality. In this affair the hysteric has the advantage, there being more sex to science than vice-

versa. Moreover the therapist's disadvantage is increased by his habit, encouraged by psychoanalytic theory, of isolating the sexual function: whether his language is clinical or vernacular, he works on the brink of pornography. To serve pornography, sexuality must be torn from the larger human context and exalted into a life of its own. And such exaltation can come from either concealment or disclosure: several petticoats may illuminate the part and its workings no less outrageously than a G-string.

Will and Invention of Fictitious Alternatives

What Tate has said of the romantic imagination applies equally to hysteria: "It has no insight into the total meanings of actual moral situations; it is concerned with fictitious alternatives to them, because they invariably mean frustration of the will." If, at this precise moment in my writing, I fall into conflict about how best to develop the hysteric's incapacity for conflict; if there seem now several possible ways, all with their privileges and limitations, yet none leading in a conclusive direction, I may suddenly discover myself moving briskly away from my chair, possessed by the almost physical necessity to walk to the drug store, where I shall case the paperback collection and purchase a second toothbrush. If I am harsher with myself than is my custom, I will wonder briefly what I am doing on this expedition, and my answers will probably have to do with fresh air and exercise. Should I be so foolish as to assure myself that this little trip allows me to think my way out of my writing dilemma, I shall have to confess there have been no thoughts: only a trip and a purchase — a compulsive voyage, a quickly achieved though irrelevant goal, and finally a return to this same chair, to begin again. The example is a deliberately trivial instance of my will inventing a fictitious alternative for me at a time when conflict would be more suitable. Obviously, many activities that enjoy the name of distraction are actually the fictitious alternatives the will devises for sidestepping possible moral conflict. And in hysteria much of what is called by such names as "impulsivity" or "acting out" are more serious — even catastrophic — adventures invented by the will, alcohol being one of its most faithful accomplices in these escapades: it performs the double service of inflating the will at the same time as it dulls discrimination.

Will as the Self

It is in will that we begin life; an infant is not only ruled by his will, he is almost indistinguishable from it — just as he is almost indistinguishable from his body. Will and consciousness in him are one. In that realm in which body and mind are not yet differentiated, the will is the self, and the self is single. This happens once in our lives only, and in a period memory cannot

penetrate. We cannot know, remember or even fully imagine it — it is somehow outside, on the threshold of human experience and understanding; and yet in various ways throughout life we remain responsive to whatever we *do* imagine about this state. Something calls to us — from beyond — or within — and our only answer is a sigh, and a sweet sad sense of loss. What is the loss? Few of us, I imagine, wish to experience infancy again. But are we not yearning, in such nostalgic moments, for the best of both worlds? Let us keep our minds, runs the dream, our differentiated intelligence and sensibility — but give us again that wholeness, that single self we once were. What this dream overlooks is that *singleness* belongs to the consciousness of the infant only insofar as he is a unity of mind and body. The *self* he has, which is single, is not the same *self* toward which we strive, having emerged, irreversibly, to a dualism of mind and body. A single self is, for us, always an invention of our will. In extremity the self is the will, but it is no longer that shadowy, elusive creature, flickering over the surface of consciousness, that we traditionally call the self. Thanks to the work of will, the self emerges whole into the bright light of the world: suddenly it has acquired shape and dimension and substance — it has been concretized by the will. The faint resemblance this imposing apparition bears to the true nature of the self testifies both to the formidable powers of the will and to the urgency of the need we all share to experience wholeness. When wholeness eludes us in its proper setting — in dialogue, so vital is it to our lives that we turn wildly to will, ready to grasp at any illusion of wholeness (however mindless or grotesque) the will conjures up for our reassurance. And caught in this illusion, delirious with well-being, we are convinced of the extraordinary keenness and clarity of our intellect. In point of fact, no state of mind so deadens — and injures — our faculties as our belief in this illusion of wholeness. The more dependent a person becomes on this illusion, the less able is he to experience true wholeness in dialogue, and at the point where he is no longer capable of dialogue he can be said to be *addicted* to his will.

The absence of "insight into the total meanings of actual moral situations" should not be understood merely psychologically. It is not only that possible frustration of will serves as a motive for blinking actual conflict as it arises in life. More important, will's solitary and inflated sovereignty as willfulness actively opposes the acquisition of precisely those intellectual faculties with which we perceive the "total meanings of actual moral situations." For the severely hysterical person there has been a cumulative failure in learning over the years as he pitted his will against the will of his parent and teacher. Whether in compliance or opposition, with charm or with rancor, he could surrender himself neither to his teacher nor his subject matter. The open admission of ignorance contained in "I don't know" is the essential precondition for

learning. But for the hysteric "I don't know," except when used as strategy, means a defeat of will. As the gaps in learning accumulate, "I don't know" is replaced by a manner of *knowingness*, which is an assortment of gestures, physical and verbal, implying not merely understanding but also the possession of far more knowledge than can be expressed in words. The hysteric considers his gaps in learning more shameful than sexual aberration and artfully hides them from the world, thus insuring their perfect isolation from the knowledge that might repair them. What was trouble with addition and subtraction in the second grade now causes the hysteric to keep his hands hidden as he counts on his fingers. But more ominous than arithmetical insufficiency is the probability that his failure with numbers is closely related to his present clumsiness in logic as it pertains to himself and the world about him. What was his original problem with grammar in the third grade now exists as an impoverishment of language rendering him invulnerable to those syntactical discriminations which we call by such names as humor, irony, ambiguity, paradox. Since we are all, to some extent, the language we speak, we could not be surprised when an hysteric whom we studied recently soberly announced, after reading the first chapter of *Huckleberry Finn*, that it was a sad story about an adopted child, neglected and intimidated by his foster parent. Such a reading is only partly an instance of a willful person discovering willfulness in a story where there is none: it also demonstrates his utter dependence, in making such a discovery, on his willful indifference to language itself. Though willfulness would seem accessible to psychotherapy, the hysteric's intellectual failure which has accumulated over the years will hardly respond to motive analysis or insight or even relation therapy, although these may constitute a beginning for learning those discriminations which belong to the world of intelligence. When it is understood that hysteria consists of a double failure in the realms of will and intelligence, it is no longer mysterious that its treatment is so arduous and time-consuming. Nor is it mysterious why such treatment, ideally, should combine psychotherapy and education in the best sense of both disciplines.

Nature of Hysterical Discourse

If ethical considerations lie beyond the capacities of hysteria, can any generalization be made about the nature of hysterical discourse? By and large the hysteric's way of addressing and perceiving his fellows and the world about him can be said to be *aesthetic*. It should be quickly noted, however, that the aestheticism of hysteria, since it is relatively uninformed by imagination and intelligence, is not of the honorable order which we often associate with the term. Moreover, the aestheticism of hysteria, being deprived of real subject matter, turns about the self, even

the body, of the hysteric. The question "What do I say and do?" becomes "How do I look when I say and do?" And not merely "How do I look?" but "How do you look?" As my friend talks to me I may be on the verge of a critical statement about what he has said, but because my attention has wandered and my intellectual powers are, for the moment, stunted, I simply cannot achieve the formulation I desire. At this instant I am struck by the fact that he is not as interesting-looking as I had thought, nor for that matter has his way of expressing himself been particularly felicitous. Let me add that I could have been on the verge of an admiring statement, which eluded me, and at the same instant have been struck by how well he looked and how well he spoke. Both examples involve my being reduced to aesthetic comment. The aestheticism of hysteria concerns itself with many variations on two questions: "Am I pretty?" (or "Am I manly?") and "Am I bright?" Both questions may be asked separately, sequentially, or simultaneously. In combination they may amount to the question, "Am I interesting?" or "Do you like me?" Although these questions may be asked affirmatively when mutual endorsement is most excited, when trouble comes to these negotiations, they will most probably be phrased, "You think me stupid. Or ugly. Or dull." With more discouragement, "I'm a fool, a mess. How could anyone like me?" Psychoanalysis with its theories of motivation will extend, if not enrich, the vocabulary of the hysteric, for this aestheticism can subvert any of the categories of characterology. "Aren't you being hostile?" or "I am put off by your tone." In a sense the hysteric welcomes the motive-analysis of psychoanalysis as a criticism of his style and as an opportunity to improve his manner.

Such aestheticism is characteristic of those hysterical suicidal gestures, whose self-mutilations serve death only accidentally. These gestures resemble conversion symptoms in that the hysteric works his will on his own body. But unlike the conversion symptom in which the function of the body is impaired, in the suicidal attempt the intactness of the body is disfigured. The gesture is an aesthetic rather than an ethical comment: despairing and bitter, it mocks the body which has failed its owner's romantic will. To the question "Am I pretty?" the gesture cries, "So be it! I *am* ugly!" or "If you think me ugly, I'll *be* ugly!" In an anti-aesthetic way ugliness rather than death would seem to be the object. And this same ugliness may, in its own perverse fashion, spread over the entire scene, affecting decor, dress, gesture, even relationship: all may become as dishevelled as the hysteric requires.

Philosophically, the distinction between will and intellect is an ideal one — an abstraction which though useful in dissecting the human spirit has, like other abstractions, done some disservice to the potentialities for totality in existence. And psychologically, if I attempt to describe the role of will in an unselfconscious

activity, I cannot help but fragment that activity into psychic and physical aspects whose sum bears little resemblance to the original totality of the experience. In our most interesting moments — dialogic moments, if you will — will is unconscious and can only willfully be pried loose from the rest of life. It is when will becomes conscious that it exists separately, can be experienced separately, and can be discussed separately. As I indicated earlier, will as willfulness may not be acknowledged by the hysteric, but this does not mean that it is repressed or unconscious: awareness is merely postponed. Will as willfulness belongs to consciousness, and in varying degree is an inescapable portion of our lives.

Subjectively, willfulness is experienced in a manner which reveals its kinship with the body. At the moment when will is preponderant, it is felt almost physically as a lunging of the body, a fact which may explain why Schopenhauer describes the body as the objectification of the will. Through will, consciousness of the physical self becomes as absorbing as physical pain. An unremitting pain, such as toothache, lands one squarely on the anterior side of the body-mind dualism: one *is* a body. One *is* mortal and since, by definition, mortality is crumbling, its claims are imperious. In pain one observes the drama of his failing body, all thought centered on the aching part. On the other hand, when will is ascendant, no spectator self observes the rush of the will; at the most one may be aware of a breathless thrusting of self which may literally cause the body to lean forward. Will is now felt as personal weight with its own momentum, expressing itself in such questions as "Do you know what I mean?" or "Do you follow me?" With these questions one reveals his awareness that the thought or pre-thought which lurched awkwardly through conversation was fortified not so much by imagination as by personal emphasis, be it of body, pitch, or language. Like an idea which becomes too old too fast, its propulsive gait could not be healed, only affirmed. In willfulness one is like a man who has lost his chance to tell his anecdote to the assembled party and now waits to make his next opportunity. People seem to go on talking in what could be a foreign language. They look interested, knowing. They even seem to share in the allotted space in the air about them, much like a page of printed dialogue, indented every line or so, which is seen for its typographical arrangement rather than for its meaning. Finally there is or isn't a pause and he says, "This has been reminding me of..." and on with the story. The pathetic attempt to assert a relevance to his story stems from his awareness that will has dulled his responsiveness, isolating him from all that has gone before yet still demanding to be heard.

This feverish figure, endlessly assaulting the company, seeking to wrench the moment to some pretense of dialogue, is the image of the eternal stranger: that condition of man in which he is forever separated from his fellows, unknown and unaddressed

— it is the figure of man's separated will posing as his total self. Though always a stranger to those he moves among, this figure is no stranger to our imagination; who is he but ourselves — you and I and everyman — as we have been over and over in the past and shall be again? This condition of willfulness which at once drives us to grasp for wholeness and prevents our attainment of it is no rare disease; even by its harsher, clinical term, hysteria, it is, in varying degree, the lot of each of us. The temptations of will beset us all because they belong inevitably to the human condition. That being the case, I should like to conclude with a word or two in defense of hysteria, but I am afraid that note of uplift is denied me. The most impressive claim made on behalf of hysteria is that the willful gestures characterizing it are often the necessary opening moves we make in overcoming the fear, despair, doubt, timidity, lethargy or excessive rationality that may come upon us at the outset of any new venture and render our indispensable commitment impossible. This claim asserts that hysteria is a prelude to passion. I would maintain that, far from being prelude or preparation, hysteria is passion's deadly adversary; hysteria loathes passion as a potential usurper of its usurped domain. With similar shrewdness it abhors wit, discrimination, imagination, humor, judgment — all those aspects of intelligence whose injury and impairment are its goal and result. It is true that we must live with hysteria, but we need not, I think, honor it. In fact, if we give it its rightful identification — as the sworn enemy of our capacity to be fully human — we may give ourselves a crucial advantage in the struggle we must constantly engage in to transcend it.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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ROLLO MAY received his Ph. D. at Columbia University and is a Fellow of the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and Psychology. Presently, Dr. May is a practicing psychoanalyst, and adjunct professor of Clinical Psychology at New York University and lecturer at the New School for Social Research. Dr. May is editor of *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology* and *Existential Psychology*. Among many publications, he is the author of *The Meaning of Anxiety* and *Man's Search for Himself*. Dr. May is the chairman of the American Association of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry.

ADRIAN VAN KAAM was born at the Hague, Holland. After studying and practicing psychology in his native country as a counselor at the Dutch Life Schools for Young Adults and at the Dutch Governmental Observation Center for Juvenile Delinquents, he earned his Ph.D. at Western Reserve University in 1958. Dr. van Kaam did post graduate work at the University of Chicago, the Alfred Adler Institute in Chicago and at Brandeis University. He was a guest lecturer at Brandeis University, and is presently director of the graduate program in Anthropological Psychology at Duquesne University. He is editor of the *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* and consulting editor of the *Journal of Individual Psychology*. Dr. van Kaam has written one book and numerous articles in the field of existential and anthropological psychology.

MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD is presently Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College of the City University of New York. Besides having a solid foundation in traditional and modern thought, he has done extensive study and work in contemporary thought. Dr. Wyschogrod is the author of numerous articles and the book *Kierkegaard and Heidegger — The Ontology of Existence*.

DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS OF Drs. FRIEDMAN AND FARBER

LOUIS E. DE ROSIS

New York, N.Y.

Introduction

When we planned this conference, the task was given to me of discussing the papers of Drs. Friedman and Farber, and of illustrating them with clinical material. My contribution has been made singularly easy by the fact that Dr. Farber's paper constitutes, in essence, a clinical illustration of many of the illuminations cast upon personality by Buber, as described by Dr. Friedman.

Buber's Approach

To begin, I feel that Buber is mostly concerned with the evolution of individuals who in my view are, relatively speaking, not excessively divided within the boundaries of their own selves. I do not know how much effort Buber has expended in being with, let us say, a severely neurotically involved patient, or a psychotic one such as we have in state hospitals. I hasten to say that I believe from my own experience that Buber's philosophy is philosophy in what I consider to be the truest sense of the word. It can come into being between the doctor and the patient at once, for its meanings are to be found right there, created out of the fabric of the relationship itself. This is living. However, there are a few terms which I should like to bring into the foreground for the sake of further clarification. One of these is "evil urge." Dr. Friedman says that a person "having lost touch with his central wish, encounters it as the 'evil urge'." The evil urge is undirected passion, ignored or suppressed.

In other words, it appears to me that what we have here are the makings of a schism which occurs after a central agency or self has come into existence. It becomes, then, the task of the self-authenticator to heal this schism. One question which occurs at this point is the following: how does it come about that the centralizing agency so comports itself, splits itself so that the split off parts come to act against the main body? Does one knowingly do this? Does the central agency become its own victim and/or victimizer? Is all of this process accomplished within awareness? Or does Buber believe, along with Freud, that there are free floating forces or elements of Id forces, from which the central agency must wrest its existence? Shall we equate "Id" with "evil urge"?

In my view, based on both experiential and logical grounds, a truly central agency, or self, will not entertain the makings of

its own dividedness. My belief is that such a central self would only be interested in seeking outside of itself the sources for what is required to realize its own basic potentials. It is clear from this, I hope, that I must now posit another development in man, and a regrettable one which is unique, like man himself, and that is man's capacity to evolve unconsciously in ways which are diametrically opposed to all those relationships that can be described by the I-It and the I-Thou. These resulting oppositions are especially malevolent, not because they set man against man, which they ultimately come to do, but because they divide man *within* his own boundaries, *without* his awareness, without his knowledge. As a consequence, man's emotive and volitional, as well as his cognitive, capacities are being constantly adulterated, shrunken or inflated, distorted into configurations which he is no longer able to perceive are other than *the* truth about himself, and, therefore, about the world.

I would, therefore, place the existence of unconscious processes at the very heart of the schism which prevents the relatedness of man. I agree with Dr. Friedman that such an atomized man can not respond in any spontaneous manner, but can only react, not because he still does not have somewhere within him a core of self, but because the split-off growths — what Dr. Farber refers to as the hysterical syndrome and others — do not permit a direct response, only an indirect one. Being with a neurotically involved person is like raising one's voice in the fiords of Norway, with the sounds ricocheting endlessly, never realizing their mark, never permitting the demarcation of the boundary of one word from the next.

True Responsibility

This brings me to another matter, which Dr. Friedman describes under the heading of an inner awareness of what "one is meant to be," an awareness that is essential if one is to be able to make genuine decisions. "One experiences one's uniqueness as a designed and preformed one, entrusted to one for execution." The question is who or what does the entrusting? I felt a sense of an outside agency here, a kind of visitation. My view would incline me to posit ideals derived from my own searching. These would be ample for the task of giving me direction until such time as new ones emerged. The neurotic, as Dr. Farber well demonstrates, cannot follow this course, for he wants to be equal to what he conceives himself "really" to be. He wants to conform to what he sets up as his aims, but he makes the leap from the aim, which is but the pathway toward an ideal, into the ideal itself. By forcing himself to experience the ideal as already attained, he changes ideals into idealization, and so he is lost to himself, lost to the sense that he is the author of his own existence. Along with this, he loses his capacity of intentionality. It seems

DISCUSSION AND CLINICAL APPLICATION

to me that intentionality comes into play when the patient is able to divest the anxiety, which creates his compulsive drives, of its charge of urgency. It is only then that he can exercise those characteristics of true responsibility. This occurs under two principal conditions:

1. The patient surrenders his strangle-hold on himself, as well as his strangle-hold on the other.

2. He gives himself over then, as does the sea to the wind, to his spontaneous impulses, as they come to bear upon his being with the doctor who stands ready with his own impulses to meet him just exactly as he comes.

"Evil Passion" and the "Compulsive Drive"

I would like now to raise the question whether we can equate Buber's "evil passion" with my formulation of the compulsive drive. I would agree that the transformation can only occur in the doctor-patient relationship. The central agency, the patient's wholeness, is so enmeshed in the intricacies of his compulsive drives, so apparently fenced in by them, that it is scarcely to be encountered. Yet I believe that the wholeness of the doctor will amplify the other's wholeness, whatever it is, to the point where the patient may now feel himself to exist as emphatically and as fully as his partner. This is possible because the doctor, in trusting the wholeness of the patient, and by the very act of deciding between what is whole and what is compulsive, imparts the freedom to the patient, in being with him, to come through with his little self, amplified or enlarged so that he too can hear, can know he is being his very own self.

In my wild speculations, I think of a person I call "Unneurotic Man." I feel this man would have no awareness of the compulsive elements in the patient, for he would be free of the compulsive in himself. No personal analysis for this analyst! It is precisely because of the compulsive in himself that the doctor must alert himself for it in the other. It is only by doing so that he can then free himself of it in the other, and then can be free to be whole with the other's wholeness. Then the processes of mutual growth can come into being for it is only then that real differences, the differences that spell creativity can develop, a happy time indeed!

The doctor begins this process by presenting himself to the other. I recall one patient with whom I sat for many hours during which he took refuge on the couch. One day he responded to my silence by saying, "Doc, you're breathing!" I knew then that he too was breathing — that we were sharing the same air — that his closed universe of omniscience could tolerate the encroachment of a trace of what we now label the I-Thou dimension in existence. This brings to mind a patient of an eminent psychiatrist with whom the latter sat for three months. This patient was a mute, catatonic schizophrenic, whom the doctor was seeing at

the special request of the family with whom he was friendly. The doctor spent all his time reading as he sat for the hour with the patient. One day the patient sat up and asked, "What the hell do you find so interesting in that book?" The doctor related that following this episode, the patient gradually recovered, an outcome he had never expected. I daresay that had he hoped for recovery, he would not have read. Had he not read, he would not have let the patient be, as no doubt many others, family included, had not done. This gave the patient the freedom to find the borders of his non-being and when he did, he was ready to cross the divide — to respond to the doctor who, by reading, was being an authentically interested-in-a-book self!

Contrast this with the unattended patient. What does he feel? He can make no immediate response, for this can only occur in the medium of himself and the doctor. Alone, he may feel he owes his life to you, or that he owes nothing of it to you. What is more, if he owes it, he owes it to you as of yesterday or as of tomorrow, never as of today. He is not free to yield his openness to the other as of now, when the other can plumb its depths and its significance, its direction and its meanings for shared existences.

Our therapeutic task comes clearer when, by our decisive act of presenting ourselves, unfettered of past ritual and unadorned by assumed glories, we live in our present, which is our life, with our patient. In this openness, he can will to venture, for he senses that in this openness, his previously disregarded wholeness will have the courage with which to emerge. Why courage? It takes as much courage as there is compulsion for the patient to make this excursion, no more and no less. The I-Thou constellation, in my belief, is for a long time the only source of courage in our patients' struggle for self-existence. Imagine your fear if your physician found cancer in you. The psychiatric patient feels an even greater terror when he finds a compulsion in himself. But he will not find it in himself unless he has you with him on the way. The steadfastness he will require here is born of the I-Thou, for in contrast to this steadfastness, the patient could only continue to run the gauntlet of the fickleness of his needs, the unpredictability of his sensitivities, the despair of his failures and the euphoria of his successes.

"Willfulness" — A Derivative of Compulsive Drives

There are a few questions I wish to address to Dr. Farber. I wonder if he means by the term "willfulness," a neurotic process the main aspect of which would also be a derivative of compulsive drives, much like the "evil urge" of Buber, except that in this case the "evil urge," or compulsion, is manifesting itself as the outermost sign of the neurotic person's being? In other words, I feel that the spontaneous urge is still at the heart of all human

existence. But in the neurotic, as this spontaneous urge is on its way out into the world it is distorted so that what emerges is only conventionally to be equated with the person's will. We the beholders assign this capacity to him. But in truth, since it is now so distorted, even though it appears as if it were a conscious (that is, expressible) aspect of the person's being, I believe it no longer deserves to be called true consciousness. In a sense, this consciousness is to be likened to a girl who is wrenching her way through a gang of men who would rape her and rend her clothes and skin, until what emerges no longer resembles the person who gave impetus to her spontaneous impulse in the first place. Sometimes the inner interferences block each other so that the impulse comes through like a released bull, with such force that it knocks down whatever is on its path.

Another example occurs of a patient who went on a date with a girl. He observed that she had her lipstick smudged and, wanting to be helpful, called it to her attention. He is totally unaware that he did so in a manner which conveyed denigration of her. All he knows is that he wanted her to look her best. As a Thou, she only heard that she was being denigrated, and reacted to him by saying that if he did not like her appearance, he could find someone else, perhaps some Jewish person, like himself. My patient then felt that she was anti-Semitic; he almost spat into her face, and "left her flat," in a towering rage at her and at himself. He raged at her for her unfairness on two counts; at himself for his stupidity at not being more discriminating, and for being so stupidly helpful. Here we have an instance of the contrary of what Buber labels the I-Thou. There are two persons, neither of whom has any boundary for the other; so they tear through or away from each other in ways that are meaningless to each other. But they are reenforcing, by the process of their reactions, their private inner meanings of themselves for themselves.

Assumptions of the "I-Thou"

I would say from my experience that what Buber means by the I-Thou is based on two basic assumptions which I make all the time when I am treating my patients. I am making one presently, as I address you. This is the assumption that I am making direct and momentary contact with you, that is, directly apprehending you, as you apprehend me similarly, by listening to me. The second assumption is that this apprehension is possible on the grounds that we have finite, identifiable boundaries, by the impingement of which, one upon the other, one knows the other. These two assumptions would describe the self-existent modes of being in the world. I believe that we occasionally touch each other in this manner. Unfortunately, the rest of the time, we approach each other in another way. This other way requires

the postulation that another mode of being develops in man, and is so common as to be generally mistaken for the "normal," for the "inevitable," and even for the congenital.

Authentic and Inauthentic Self

Karen Horney collected the characteristics of this form of development under the heading of the "idealized self," which would stand in absolute contrast to the authentic self, or the real self that emerges in the dyad of the I-Thou relationship. The idealized self is the antithesis of true openness, for it is at once *absolute* openness, as well as absolute closedness. It has no inter-est, and therefore no existence. In this ultimate form, it reveals the conflict which we recognize in the vicissitudes of the neurotic development in man.

The self-starved person seizes freedom as the famished man seizes food, only to have to spew it out, not being able to contain it in a self that is poorly developed for the heavy burden of responsibility which freedom brings. This self retreats in horror and nausea, filled with the dread of being. Contrast the person just described, who overloads himself with responsibility until he collapses under the load of guilt, with Dr. Farber's hysterical patient. I enjoyed the part about the hypnotized hypnotist hypnotizing the already hypnotized. I feel he is describing what in my terms are the vicissitudes of such an underdeveloped self, forcing its own fulfillment, not in the I-It, but in the I-Thou.

The difficulties begin when neither one has discovered his own boundaries so that neither can know the boundaries of the other. So the two pass into and out of each other boundlessly, each one thereby feeling alternately infinitely reenforced and empowered, or abysmally depleted, abandoned and isolated. One of my patients described these episodes as occasions when he and his homosexual partner would "fall into each other." Here, I believe, we have the expression of what I would label the meeting of two absolutizing wills or selves. Of course, there is no meeting, just a fitting together; the mechanical aspect of the sexual act illustrates it well. In colloquial language, this fitting process is unconsciously alluded to: for example, "He is going on the make," or "Did you make her?", or "She can be had," etc. Here is what is essentially the I-Thou distorted into the I-It, except for the fact that the It is a person and the I is an absolutistic, or objectifying I. It is for this reason that I do not believe the hysteric can be said to be conscious of his willfulness until he experiences the compulsively objectifying tendency in himself. When this occurs, we have the beginnings of the moral crisis, the evolution of which will spell the dissolution and resolution of his anxiety-laden compulsive drives, with the concomitant emergence of the self in the doctor-patient relation.

I wish to thank Drs. Friedman and Farber for giving me the opportunity to discuss their papers.

WILL, DECISION AND RESPONSIBILITY: SUMMARY REMARKS *

ROLLO MAY

New York, N.Y.

Introduction

There is no better area in which to inquire into the distinctive character of existential psychotherapy and what distinguishes it from orthodox psychoanalysis than that of our present theme. One of Freud's great contributions — if not his greatest — lay in his cutting through the futility and self-deceit in Victorian "will power," conceived by our nineteenth century forefathers as the faculty by which they "made resolutions" and purportedly directed their lives down the rational and moral roads the culture said they should go. I say possibly Freud's "greatest" contribution not only because in this area of "wish" and "drive" lay Freud's profound power as the formulator of a new image of man that shook to the very foundations our emotional, moral and intellectual self-image in Western history, but also because it was the exploration of this area that made possible Freud's formulation of what he called the "unconscious." He uncovered the vast areas in which behavior and motives are determined by unconscious urges, anxiety, fears, and the endless host of bodily drives and instinctual forces. Under his penetrating analysis Victorian "will" did indeed turn out to be a web of rationalization and self-deceit. He was entirely accurate in his diagnosis of this morbid side of Victorian "will power."

But along with this emphasis there went an unavoidable undermining of the functions of will and decision themselves and similarly an unavoidable emphasis upon man as determined, driven, "lived *by* the unconscious," as Freud, agreeing with the words of Groddeck, put it. This reflected, rationalized and played into the hands of modern man's pervasive tendency — which has become almost a disease in the middle of the twentieth century — to see himself as passive, the willy-nilly product of the powerful juggernaut of economic forces (as Marx on the socio-economic level demonstrated with a brilliant analysis parallel to Freud's). Of late years this tendency has spread to include contemporary man's conviction that he is the helpless victim of scientific forces in the atom bomb, about the use of which the citizen in the street feels powerless to do anything. Indeed, a central core of modern

* This paper is not a summary of the previous papers in this discussion, which I had not heard until the conference. It is a presentation of summary thoughts of my own on the general theme. Several of the early paragraphs here are from my chapter, "The Emergence of Existential Psychology," in *Existential Psychology*, Random House, New York, 1961.

man's "neurosis" is the undermining of his experience of himself as responsible, the sapping of his willing and decision. This lack of will is much more than merely an ethical problem: the modern individual so often has the conviction that even if he *did* exert his "will" and capacity for decision, his efforts would not make any difference anyway.

Now it was against precisely these trends that the existentialists like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche took their strongest, most vehement stand. And it is in the light of modern man's broken will that the existential emphases of Schopenhauer with his world as "Will and idea," Bergson with his "elan vital," William James with his "will to believe" are to be understood.

The protest of the existentialists was violent and at times desperate (as in Nietzsche), at other times noble and courageous (as in the resistance movement of Camus and Sartre), even if it seemed to many observers to be ineffectual against the on-moving lava of conformism, collectivism, and the robot man. The existentialists' central proclamation was this: No matter how great the forces victimizing the human being, man has the capacity to *know* that he is being victimized, and thus to influence in some way how he will relate to his fate. There is never lost that kernel of the power to take some stand, to make some decision, no matter how minute. This is why the existentialists hold that man's existence consists, in the last analysis, of his freedom. Tillich has phrased this view beautifully, "Man becomes truly human only at the moment of decision" (1961, pp. 8-16).

Effects of Determinism

The implications of this problem for psychology are, of course, profound. In general in our academic psychological tradition we have tended to accept the position, no matter what individual psychologists themselves believed about their own ethical actions, that as psychologists we were concerned only with what is determined and can be understood in a deterministic framework. This limitation of perception, of course, tended inevitably to make our man into the image of what we let ourselves see.

In psychoanalysis and psychotherapy the problem of the undermining of will and decision became more critical, for the theory and process of psychoanalysis and most other forms of psychotherapy inevitably played into the passive tendencies of the patient. As Otto Rank and Wilhelm Reich in the 1920's began to point out, there were built-in tendencies in psychoanalysis itself that sapped its vitality and tended to emasculate not only the reality with which psychoanalysis deals but the power and inclination of the patient to change. In the early days of psychoanalysis, when revelations of the unconscious had an obvious "shock value," this problem did not come out so much into the open; and in any case with hysterical patients, who

formed the bulk of those Freud worked with in his early formative years, there does exist a special dynamic in what Freud could call "repressed libido" pushing for expression. But now when most of our patients are "compulsives" of one form or another, and everybody knows about the Oedipus complex, and our patients talk about sex with an apparent freedom which would have shocked Freud's Victorian patients off the couch (and, indeed, talking about sex is perhaps the easiest way of avoiding really making any *decisions* about love and sexual relatedness), the problem of the undermining of will and decision cannot longer be avoided. The "repetition compulsion," a problem that has always remained intractable and insoluble within the context of classical psychoanalysis, is in my judgment fundamentally related to this dilemma about will and decision.

Other forms of psychotherapy do not escape the dilemma of psychoanalysis, namely that the process of psychotherapy itself has built-in tendencies which invite the patient to relinquish his position as the deciding agent. The very name "patient" proposes it. Not only do the automatic supportive elements in therapy have this tendency, but so does also the tendency to search for everything else as responsible for one's problems rather than one's self. To be sure, psychotherapists of all stripes and schools realize that sooner or later the patient must make some decisions, learn to take some responsibility for himself; but the theory and the technique of most psychotherapy tends to be built on exactly the opposite premise.

A New Approach

The existential approach in psychology and psychotherapy holds that we cannot leave will and decision to chance. We cannot work on the assumption that ultimately the patient "somehow happens" to make a decision, or slides into a decision by ennui, default, or mutual fatigue with the therapist, or acts from sensing that the therapist (now the benevolent parent) will approve of him if he does take such and such steps. The existential approach puts decision and will back into the center of the picture — "The very stone which the builders rejected has become the head of the corner." Not in the sense of "free will against determinism"; this issue is dead and buried. Nor in the sense of denying what Freud describes as unconscious experience; these deterministic "unconscious" factors certainly operate, and the existentialists, who make much of "finiteness" and man's limitations, certainly know this. They hold, however, that in the revealing and exploring of these deterministic forces in his life, the patient is orienting himself in some particular way to the data and thus is engaged in some choice, no matter how seemingly insignificant; is experiencing some freedom, no matter how subtle. The existential attitude in psychotherapy does not at all

"push" the patient into decisions; indeed, I am convinced that it is only by this clarification of the patient's own powers of will and decision that the therapist can avoid inadvertently and subtly pushing the patient in one direction or another. The existentialist point is that self-consciousness itself — the person's potential awareness that the vast, complex, protean flow of experience is *his* experience — brings in inseparably the element of decision at every moment.

We are, of course, using the terms "will" and "decision" in a way that does not at all refer exclusively to the momentous and life-shaping decisions only; the words have infinitely more extensive and subtle meaning. And though perception always involves decision (the act, for example, of electing what you are going to attend to), decision and perception must not at all be identified. Decision always brings in some element that is not only not determined by the outside situation but not even *given* in the external situation; it involves some element of leap, some taking of a chance, some movement of one's self in a direction the ultimate outcome of which one can never fully predict before the leap. This "leap" is obviously involved in the big decisions of life, but my point here is that qualitatively it is present in some degree or other in experiences as simple and non-world shaking as any new idea I find myself entertaining or any new memory that pops up in a seemingly random chain of free association. This is part of the explanation of the fact that anxiety arises in free associations and the birth of new ideas: I am then in a "new place," I see myself and my life in a slightly different way and must re-orient myself accordingly. The mature human being (i.e., one who is not rigidly constricted and determined by neurotic compulsive patterns) generally takes this anxiety in stride and is then ready to make the new orientation and the new "decision" in the place in which he now finds himself.

Will and Decision in Existential Therapies

It is these and similar considerations which have led the existential psychotherapists to be concerned with the problems of will and decision as central to the process of therapy. But when we turn to the endeavor to understand will and decision themselves, we find our task is not at all easy. Our problem hinges upon the terms "will" and "wish" and the interrelation between the two. The word "will," associated as it is with "will power," is dubious to say the least and perhaps no longer helpful or even available. But the reality it has historically described must be retained. "Will power" expresses the arrogant efforts of Victorian man to manipulate nature and to rule nature with an iron hand (*vide* industrialism and capitalism); and to manipulate himself, rule his own life in the same way as an object (shown particularly in Protestantism but present in other modern ethical and religious

systems as well). Thus "will" was set over against "wish" and used as a faculty by which "wish" could be denied. I have observed in patients that the emphasis on "will power" is often a reaction formation to their own repressed passive desires, a way of fighting off their wishes to be taken care of; and the likelihood is that this mechanism had much to do with the form will power took in Victorianism. Victorian man sought, as Schachtel has put it, to deny that he ever had been a child, to repress his irrational tendencies and so-called infantile wishes as unacceptable to his concept of himself as a grown-up and responsible man. Will power was then a way of avoiding awareness of bodily and of sexual urges or hostile impulses that did not fit the picture of the controlled, well-managed self.

Clinical Application

Speaking now of the concrete individual clinically, the process of using will to deny wish results in a greater and greater emotional void, a progressive emptying of inner contents which must ultimately impoverish intellectual experience as well. If I may speak epigrammatically, the more such an individual *succeeds* in developing his will-power, that is the more he becomes able to make up his mind, the less sure we are that he has any mind to make up. Woodrow Wilson once remarked speaking of this type of post-puritan man, "I take leave to believe that the man who sets out to develop his own character will develop only that which will make him intolerable to other men." And we could add, intolerable to himself. For no one needs to remind us now of the great stores of resentment, inhibition, hostility and inability to love, and the related clinical symptoms which can develop as a result of this repressive kind of will power.

In attacking these morbid psychological processes, Freud produced his far-reaching emphasis on the *wish*. The term "wish" let us hasten to say in view of the fact that in our post-Victorian day we still tend to impoverish the word by making it a concession to our immaturity or "needs," may be seen as related to processes much more extensive than the residue of childhood. Its correlates can be found in all phenomena in nature down to the most minute pattern of atomic reaction, for example, in the context of what Whitehead and Tillich describe as negative-positive movements in all nature. (Tropism is one form in its etymological sense of the innate tendency in biological organisms to "turn toward.") If, however, we stop with "wish" as this more or less blind and involuntary movement of one particle toward another or one organism toward another, as Freud did, we are inexorably pushed to Freud's pessimistic conclusion of the "death instinct," the inevitable tendency of organisms to move back toward the inorganic. Thus in human beings "wish" can never be seen without relation to "will."

Our problem now becomes the inter-relation of "wish" and "will." I shall offer some suggestions which, though not intended to make a neat definition, show us some of the aspects of the problem that must be taken into consideration. "Wish" and "will" may be seen as operating in polarity. "Will" requires consciousness, wish does not. "Will" implies some possibility of freedom of choice, "wish" does not. "Wish" gives the warmth, the content, the child's play, the freshness and richness to "will." Will gives the self-direction, the freedom, the maturity to "wish." If you have only will and no wish, you have the dried up Victorian, post-Puritan man. If you have only wish and no will, you have the driven, unfree infantile human being who as an adult may become the robot man.

I propose the term "decision" to stand for the human act which brings both will and wish together. Decision in this sense does not deny or exclude wish but incorporates it and transcends it. Decision in an individual takes into the picture the experiencing of all wishes, but it forms these into a way of acting which is consciously chosen. Despite the fact that the word "decision" lost much of its usefulness for those of us in New York when Billy Graham came to town, it nevertheless remains in many ways the most useful and viable term for the uniting of wish and will.

Therapeutic Dimensions

The process of therapy with individual patients involves bringing together these three dimensions of wish, will and decision. As the patient moves from one dimension to the next in his integration, the previous level is incorporated and remains present in the next. We shall now show more fully the meaning of our problem by describing practical therapy on three levels.

The first dimension, wish, occurs on the level of *awareness*, the dimension which the human organism shares with all nature. The experiencing of infantile wishes, bodily needs and desires, sexuality and hunger and all the infinite and inexhaustible gamut of wishes which occur in any individual, seems to be a central part of practically all therapy from that of Rogers on one wing to the most classical Freudian on the other. Experiencing these wishes may involve dramatic and sometimes traumatic anxiety and upheaval as the repressions which led to the blocking off of the awareness in the first place are brought out into the open. On the significance and necessity of unmasking repression — dynamic aspects which are beyond the scope of our present discussion — various kinds of therapy differ radically; but I cannot conceive of any form of *psychotherapy* which does not accord the process of awareness itself a central place. The experiencing of these wishes may come out in the simplest forms of the desire to fondle or be fondled, the wishes associated originally

with nursing and closeness to mother and family members in early experience, the touch of the hand of a friend or loved one in adult experience, the simple pleasure of wind and water against one's skin; and it goes all the way up to the sophisticated experiences which may come, for example, in a dazzling instant when one is standing near a clump of blooming forsythia and is suddenly struck by how much more brilliantly blue the sky looks when seen beyond the sea of yellow flowers. The immediate awareness of the world continues throughout life, hopefully at an accelerating degree, and is infinitely more varied and rich than one would gather from most psychological discussions.

From the existential viewpoint, this growing awareness of one's body, wishes and desires — processes which are obviously related to the experiencing of identity — normally also brings heightened appreciation of one's self as a being and a heightened reverence for Being itself. Here the eastern philosophies like Zen Buddhism have much to teach us.

The second level in the relating of *wish* to *will* in therapy is the transmuting of awareness into self-consciousness. This level is correlated with the distinctive form of awareness in human beings, consciousness. (The term *consciousness*, coming etymologically from *con* plus *scire*, "knowing with," is used here as synonymous with self-consciousness.) * On this level the patient experiences I-am-the-one-who-has-these-wishes. This is the level of accepting one's self as having a world. If I experience the fact that my wishes are not simply blind pushes toward someone or something, that I am the one who stands in this world where touch, nourishment, sexual pleasure and relatedness may be possible between me and other persons, I can begin to see how I may do something about these wishes. This gives me the possibility of *in-sight*, of "inward sight," of seeing the world and other people in relation to myself. Thus the previous alternatives of repressing wishes because one cannot stand the lack of their gratification on one hand, or being compulsively pushed to the blind gratification of the wishes and desires on the other, are replaced by the experience of the fact that I myself am involved in these relationships of pleasure, love, beauty, trust and I hopefully then have the possibility of changing my own behavior to make these more possible.

On this level *will* enters the picture, not as a denial of *wish* but as an incorporation of *wish* on the higher level of consciousness. To refer to our example above: the experiencing of the blue of the sky behind forsythia blossoms on the simple level of awareness and *wish* may bring delight and the desire to continue or renew the experience; but the realization that I am the person

* I have developed relationships of awareness to self-consciousness elsewhere. *The existential bases of psychotherapy*, in *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, October, 1960, Vol. XXX, No. 4. Strictly speaking, "self-consciousness" is redundant: consciousness already implies relation to the self.

who lives in a world in which flowers are yellow and the sky so brilliant, and that I can even increase my pleasure by sharing this experience with a friend, has profound implications for life, love, death, and the other ultimate problems of human existence. As Tennyson remarks when he looks at the flower in the crannied wall, "...I could understand what God and man are."

The third level in the process of therapy is that of *decision* and *responsibility*. I use these two terms together to indicate that decision is not simply synonymous with will. Responsibility involves being responsive, *responding*. As consciousness is the distinctively human form of awareness, so decision and responsibility are the distinctive forms of consciousness in the human being who is moving toward self-realization, integration, maturity. Again, this dimension is not achieved by denying wishes and self-assertive will, but incorporates and keeps present the previous two levels. *Decision* in our sense forms the two previous levels into a pattern of acting and living which is not only empowered and enriched by wishes and asserted by will but is responsive to and responsible for the significant other persons who are important to one's self in the realizing of the long-term goals. This sounds like an ethical statement, and *is* in the sense that ethics have their psychological base in these capacities of the human being to transcend the concrete situation of immediate self-oriented desire and to live in the dimensions of past and future and in terms of the welfare of the persons and groups upon which one's own fulfillment intimately depends. The point, however, cannot be dismissed as "just" ethical. If it is not self-evident it could be demonstrated along the lines of Sullivan's interpersonal theory of psychiatry, Buber's philosophy and other viewpoints, that wish, will and decision occur within a nexus of relationships upon which the individual himself depends not only for his fulfillment but for his very existence.

Interrelation of Wish, Will and Decision

May I now illustrate the interrelation of the levels of wish, will and decision with a personal example. I have for some time had the practice of never making an important decision without analysing my dreams the night before. Not because the dreams will determine the decision, although I believe every dream has an element of decision in it, every dream pushes toward some act, but because the dream will assumedly present my archaic and wish levels bearing upon my act. Indeed, I may then decide just the opposite to the tendency or desire shown in the dream. The dream may show anxiety, fear of making the decision and a wish to flee to the Sahara Desert and join the Foreign Legion or to take some other easier way out, or it may predict dire doom for me if I make the decision. Or the dream may show that the decision I have in mind is being made on the basis of self-

deceitful, hypocritical motives. I seek to be as fully aware as possible of all these more primitive levels within me in making the decision; otherwise the decision will be wrongly made. Or assuming I believe it is the right decision and I make it but without awareness of my buried wishes, I will be sabotaged by some unconscious elements within me in my acts that carry out the decision. I want, rather, to take my dream along with me, reluctant companion though it may be. One cannot give over oneself to the dream; but not to be aware of what it is telling one is just the way to turn it into a compulsive drive. The decision hopefully will be made responsive to these inner tendencies as well as responsive to one's conscious relationship to the other persons involved and the future welfare of one's self and them. The decision then occurs on a level that incorporates wish and will, even though one knows that he will still have to make the decision despite anxiety and *against* some aspects of himself. This points toward the important existential concept of commitment, the rich and profound implication of which goes beyond our present discussion.

If decision and responsibility thus include previous levels as we have been pointing out, the usual concepts of "self" and "ego" in psychology are inadequate. I propose a concept borrowed from Paul Tillich: the *act of the centered self*. Actions that proceed from an integration of the levels of awareness and wish with will and consciousness, and ensue in behavior which is responsible, are acts of the centered self.

Concepts of Ego Psychology

Let us turn our attention for a brief caveat to the concepts of "ego" and what is called ego psychology, since it is often argued that the problems of will, decision and responsibility are encompassed in psychoanalytic ego psychology. In the last few years, in response to contemporary man's great need for autonomy and a sense of identity, considerable interest has swung to "ego psychology" in the psychoanalytic movement. But what has resulted has been the handing over to the ego of the functions of autonomy, sense of identity, synthesis of experience and other functions, more or less arbitrarily arrived at, which were suddenly discovered as functions the human being had to have. The result in the orthodox analytic movement is that many "egos" now appear. Karl Menninger speaks of the "observing ego," the "regressive ego," the "reality ego," the "healthy ego," et cetera (1928). A Freudian colleague and friend of mine congratulated me after a speech in which I had attacked this concept of a horde of egos by remarking that I had a good "synthetic ego"! Some psychoanalysts now speak of "multiple egos in the same personality," referring not to neurotic personalities but to the so-called normal ones. To my mind, "multiple egos" is a precise description of a neurotic personality.

In this picture of many different egos, where has the principle of centeredness vanished to? If you have this multitude of egos, you have by definition lost the center of organization, the center of unity that would make any centered act possible. If it is countered that this picture of the multitude of egos reflects the fragmentation of contemporary man, I would rejoin that any concept of fragmentation presupposes some unity of which it is a fragmentation. Rapaport writes an essay entitled "The Autonomy of the Ego" as part of the recent development we are referring to; Jung has a chapter in one of his books entitled "The Autonomy of the Unconscious"; and someone could write an essay, following Cannon's "Wisdom of the Body," entitled "The Autonomy of the Body." Each would have a partial truth; but would not each be fundamentally wrong? For neither the "ego" nor the "unconscious" nor the body can be autonomous. Autonomy by its very nature can be located only in the centered self.

In our inquiry for a new concept which will do justice to the intricate problems of wish, will and decision, the concept of "the act of the centered self" has several merits. It includes the *act*. In the emphasis upon the *centered* nature of the self, it takes into consideration that there are three aspects of what is loosely called self, three aspects of this centeredness. The "ego" as Freud used it, the "swivel" with the real world, the organ of perception by which the individual sees and assesses and relates to the outside world, is one aspect. A second aspect is the "subjective self," which is what most people mean when speaking untechnically about the self, the capacity to be aware that I am the one who sees the world in such and such ways, that I am the one who behaves in such and such ways. The third aspect is what William James called the "self" and Jung the "persona," the social roles the individual plays, the self as reflected in social and interpersonal relations.

Act of the Centered Self

Now the centeredness of a given self must be presupposed if these three aspects are to have meaning. At this point our European colleagues would use some form of the term "being," which unfortunately remains still almost unusable in English. They speak of *Dasein* as the individual who experiences himself as here and now, present at this given instant in history, accepting the fact that he is thus present — which means being to greater or lesser degree responsible. Our phrase *the act of the centered self* has both this subjective and objective meaning; and thus the concept of "being" must in some form or other be presupposed.

This being, or centered self, comes into existence *at the point where one is able to commit one's self*. The unity occurs at the

moment of putting one's self on the line and accepting the risk unavoidably connected with this commitment. We see now more of the underlying meaning in Tillich's sentence quoted earlier in this paper, "Man becomes truly human only in the moment of decision."

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BOOK REVIEWS

WILLIAM A. LUIJPEN, Ph.D.

EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, Philosophical Series, no. 12, 1960. Pp. xiii + 362. \$ 6.75 bound, \$ 6.00 paper.

It is characteristic of current existential thinking in psychology and psychiatry to concern itself with fundamental assumptions and to inquire into the premises implied in various psychologies of man. And yet, in American psychology the existential-phenomenological approach is still a "movement, a climate of thought" whose assumptions usually remain implicit and vague. For many of us, the existential approach remains a half intuited, unclear emphasis on such concepts as self-hood, freedom, uniqueness of personality, individuality, etc. This was certainly the case for the reviewer until he had studied Luijpen's book, which provided a real clarification of what had before been only vaguely grasped insights. *Existential Phenomenology* provides a clearly articulated base for the existential approach in psychology and psychiatry.

The book is a lucid, well written, well organized, personal restatement of the fundamental insights of existential phenomenology. It is copiously footnoted to indicate sources, and has a personal writing quality rare in such scholarly work. Each phrase, each thought, has clearly become Luijpen's own before being written. The translation is well handled with true fidelity to the original text, which has the slight disadvantage of making the original Dutch language show through the English. This introduces an occasional oddness to the phrasing, which can be distracting and yet, at times, gives additional clarity and impact to the thought.

Each section of this work is so rich in implications, especially for the student of human nature, that it is distinctly worthy of intensive study. However, it does seem important to warn the prospective reader not to allow himself to get bogged down the first time through. In this book, as in any really profound unified work, the first chapter is not fully appreciated until the last chapter is finished; for each part resonates with and clarifies every other part, creating a really balanced synthesis.

This is not a book *about* existentialism or *concerning* phenomenology, but rather a personal rethinking of major philosophic problems within the context of the thinking of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Marcel. One can not help sensing the authenticity of the writing expressed in its fidelity to human experience.

The first two chapters, "Man, the Metaphysical Being" and "Phenomenology of Knowledge," provide a lucid and rich introduction to the fundamental concepts of existentialism. The ideas of intentionality, world, etc. are applied in an illuminating clarifying way to a wide variety of areas including the philosophy of science, the phenomena of technocracy, fundamental metaphysics, etc.

With the first two chapters as foundation, the third chapter on the "Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity" will be of special interest to the psychologically oriented reader. Already impressed by the importance of interpersonal relations, he finds here a clear expression of the centrality of existence as co-existence. Further, the elaboration of the idea that I know the other through *his* body already reveals for the researcher or therapist an avenue for unveiling phenomena which have previously been relatively inaccessible to scientific investigation. In the same chapter are found accurate psychological descriptions of hatred, indifference, and love. These descriptions are so well rooted in experience that they are, at one and the same time, both philosophical and psychological.

In the fourth and final chapter, "Phenomenology of Freedom and Its Destiny," are found extensive descriptions of the nature of man's freedom, his morality, the question concerning the meaning of life, and the beginning of an existential theology.

In summary, *Existential Phenomenology* is a book of major importance for existential psychology and psychiatry, providing a clear foundation for a genuine reappraisal of the field. If you read it with care, you will find much of your thinking transformed, deepened, and clarified.

A. Barton

REVIEW
OF
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY

ADRIAN VAN KAAM, *Editor*

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